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Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in
Lending Markets
By Gregory S. Crawford, Nicola Pavanini and Fabiano Schivardi∗
We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect
competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We
estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing,
and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We
find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correla-
tion between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and
default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases
in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reduc-
ing credit supply, banks’ market power can mitigate these negative
effects. (JEL D82, G21, L13)
Following the seminal work of G. Akerlof (1970), M. Rothschild and J. E. Stiglitz
(1976), and J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss (1981), a large theoretical literature has
stressed the important role of asymmetric information in financial markets. This
literature has shown that asymmetric information can generate market failures
such as credit rationing, misspricing of risk and, in the limit, market breakdown.
Indeed, the recent financial crisis can be seen as an extreme manifestation of these
market failures, whose effects are likely to become more acute during recessions
(J. Tirole 2006). Deepening our understanding of the extent and consequences of
asymmetric information is critical for the design of regulatory frameworks that
limit its negative effects.
Although the basic theoretical issues are well understood, empirical work an-
alyzing asymmetric information is still uncommon. One reason is that, by def-
inition, asymmetric information is hard to measure. If a borrower has better
information than a lender, it is unlikely that a researcher can do better. While
researchers cannot generally construct measures of ex-ante unobserved charac-
teristics determining riskiness, they can often observe ex-post outcomes, such as
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loan defaults. For this reason, the empirical literature, both in credit and insur-
ance markets, has analyzed how agents with different ex-post outcomes self-select
ex-ante into contracts with different characteristics in terms of price, coverage, or
deductibles (P. A. Chiappori and B. Salanie´ 2000, L. Einav, M. Jenkins and J.
Levin 2012, A. Starc 2014).1
The vast majority of this literature analyzes the consequences of asymmetric
information using models of competitive markets. Assuming perfect competition
in lending markets is not desirable, however, as market structure and asymmetric
information can be intimately related. On the one side, informational frictions can
constitute a barrier to entry and thus contribute to determining market structure
(G. Dell’Ariccia, E. Friedman and R. Marquez 1999, M. Bofondi and G. Gobbi
2006); on the other, the effects of asymmetric information may depend on market
structure itself (M. A. Petersen and R. G. Rajan 1994, X. Vives 2016). This
is particularly important for the environment we analyze, the Italian market for
small business loans: as shown by L. Guiso, P. Sapienza and L. Zingales (2004),
legal entry barriers, whose effects persisted into the 1990s, have shaped its local
nature and high degree of concentration.
A recent strand of theoretical research has focussed on the effects of adverse se-
lection in the presence of market power (B. Lester, A. Shourideh, V. Venkateswaran
and A. Zetlin-Jones 2017, N. Mahoney and E. G. Weyl 2017). With perfect com-
petition, banks price at average cost (e.g., Einav and Finkelstein 2011). When
adverse selection increases, prices rise, as a riskier pool of borrowers implies more
defaults and higher average costs. When banks exert market power, however,
greater adverse selection can lower prices, as it implies a riskier pool of borrowers
at any given price, lowering infra-marginal benefits of a high price in the standard
(e.g. monopoly) pricing equation. This implies both that adverse selection can
moderate the welfare losses from market power and that imperfect competition
can moderate the welfare consequences of adverse selection.
We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect com-
petition in the market for small business lines of credit. We exploit detailed
data on a representative sample of Italian firms, the population of medium and
large Italian banks, individual lines of credit between them, and subsequent de-
faults. While our data include a measure of observable credit risk comparable to
that available to a bank during the application process, we also allow firms to
have private information about the underlying riskiness of the project they seek
to finance. The market is characterized by adverse selection if riskier firms are
more likely to either demand credit, use more of their loan, or both. Following
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), an increase in the interest rate exacerbates adverse
selection, inducing a deterioration in the quality of the borrower pool. After
providing reduced-form evidence of adverse selection and imperfect competition
in this market, we formulate and estimate a model of credit demand, loan use,
1See L. Einav and A. Finkelstein (2011), L. Einav, A. Finkelstein and J. Levin (2010), and P. A.
Chiappori and B. Salanie´ (2013) for extensive surveys of this literature.
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default, and bank pricing that allows us to estimate the extent of adverse selec-
tion and to run counterfactuals that approximate economic environments of likely
concern to policymakers.
We begin by constructing a model in which banks offer loan contracts to firms.
Banks are differentiated by their network of branches, the years in which they
have been in a market, and the distance between a potential borrower and their
closest branch. Banks compete Bertrand-Nash on interest rates, which also act
as a screening device as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Firms seek lines of credit to
finance the ongoing activities associated with a particular business project, the
riskiness of which is their private information. For their main line of credit, firms
choose a bank from which to borrow, if any, according to a mixed logit demand
system. They also choose how much of this credit line to use. Finally, they decide
whether to repay the loan or default. There are two critical correlations in the
model: that between the unobservable determinants of the choice to take up a
loan and default (the extensive margin) and that between unobserved determi-
nants of how much of that loan to use and default (the intensive margin). When
these correlations are positive, we say that the market is characterized by adverse
selection: riskier firms are more likely to demand and use credit.
The degree of competition can have significant consequences on the equilibrium
effects of adverse selection in our model. We show that banks with higher market
power have lower incentives to increase prices following an increase in adverse
selection. This is confirmed by a Monte Carlo simulation: when markets are
competitive, more adverse selection always leads to higher interest rates and less
credit. As banks’ market power increases, however, this relationship becomes
weaker and eventually turns negative.2
We estimate the model on detailed microdata covering individual loans between
firms and banks between 1988 and 1998. There are two key sources of data. The
first, from the Italian Central Credit Register (Centrale dei Rischi), provides
detailed information on all individual loans extended by the 94 largest Italian
banks (which account for 80% of the loan market), including the identity of the
borrower and interest rate charged. It also reports whether the firm subsequently
defaulted. The second, from the Centrale dei Bilanci database, provides detailed
information on borrowers’ balance sheets and income statements. Critically, this
second dataset includes an observable measure of each firm’s default risk, which
is called its “Score.” Combining the two datasets yields a matched panel of
borrowers and lenders. While the data span a 11-year period and most firms in
the data take out multiple loans, in our empirical analysis we only use the first
year of each firm’s main line of credit. This avoids the need to model the dynamics
of firm-bank relationships and the inferences available to subsequent lenders of
2B. Handel (2013), J. Lustig (2011), and Starc (2014) analyze adverse selection and imperfect compe-
tition in US health insurance markets. Each of these focuses on the price-reducing effect of asymmetric
information in the presence of imperfect competition. None, however, articulates the non-monotonicity of
these effects depending on the strength of competition, an empirically relevant result in our application.
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existing lines of credit.3 We define local markets at the level of Italian provinces,
administrative units roughly comparable to a US county that, as discussed in
detail by L. Guiso, L. Pistaferri and F. Schivardi (2013), constitute a natural
geographical market for small business lending. We estimate individual firms’
demand for lines of credit, banks’ pricing of these lines, firms’ loan use, and their
subsequent default. We extend the econometric approach of Einav, Jenkins and
Levin (2012) to the case of multiple lenders by assuming unobserved tastes for
credit independent of the specific bank chosen by the firm. We combine this
framework with the literature on demand estimation for differentiated products
(S. Berry 1994, S. Berry, J. Levinsohn and A. Pakes 1995). Data on default, loan
use, demand, and pricing separately identify the distribution of firms’ riskiness
from heterogeneous firms’ demand for credit.
We face two important challenges in identifying adverse selection in the struc-
tural model. First, we only observe prices for firm-bank pairs that actually es-
tablished a loan relationship, while to estimate the model we also need prices
charged by banks from whom firms chose not to borrow. Second, while we have
extensive information about firms’ characteristics, there may still be determinants
of demand, loan use, and default that are observed by banks but not by us as
econometricians, and such “soft information” (e.g. a bank’s perception of a firm’s
creditworthiness) may determine loan pricing. We address these challenges using
a unique feature of our data, multi-bank borrowing, to estimate a price prediction
model with firm fixed effects. This allows us to predict prices accounting for any
price-relevant firm characteristic that is common across banks and that they ob-
serve and we do not. This ensures that our estimates of adverse selection are not
driven by informational differences between us as econometricians and banks. We
also address the potential endogeneity of price in our three estimating equations
using instrumental variable methods.
In our results, we find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a statistically
significant correlation of 0.16 between the unobserved determinants of the choice
to borrow and unobserved determinants of default, and of 0.14 between unob-
served determinants of loan use and default. These results imply that firms with
a higher unexplained propensity to borrow, on both the extensive and intensive
margins, are also more likely to default. We also find a positive effect of interest
rates on default, which we interpret as evidence of moral hazard.
We run three counterfactuals to quantify the effects of adverse selection and
understand its interaction with imperfect competition. In the first experiment,
we analyze how market outcomes vary with the degree of adverse selection and its
interaction with market power. We do so by doubling the estimated correlation
coefficients in the unobserved determinants of loan demand, loan use, and default,
and looking at how equilibrium prices, demand, and default vary in response. We
then relate these outcomes to banks’ markups before the change, which we use
3A similar approach is followed by, among others, Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000). We model the
dynamics of firm-bank relationships in a companion paper (N. Pavanini and F. Schivardi 2017).
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as a measure of bank market power. This experiment illustrates the implications
of adverse selection and market power in our estimated model and delivers two
important findings. First, consistent with the majority of the theoretical literature
analyzing adverse selection in competitive environments, we find that the average
effect of an increase in adverse selection is to increase prices and reduce the supply
of credit. Second, we find that market power significantly mitigates this effect:
while increased adverse selection increases prices by an average of 12.9 percentage
points, a one standard deviation increase in a bank’s average markup lessens this
increase by 6 percentage points.
In a second counterfactual, we simulate a potential effect of a financial crisis:
an increase in banks’ cost of capital. With this exercise, we seek to separately
identify the effects of adverse selection and imperfect competition on the trans-
mission mechanisms of higher capital costs to the economy. We find that, in the
presence of adverse selection, banks with higher market power are less likely to
raise prices following an increase in the cost of capital. In a final counterfactual,
we investigate further the interaction between adverse selection and imperfect
competition by simulating a merger between the two largest banks in each local
market. We find that under high adverse selection, a larger fraction of prices
declines as concentration rises.
All in all, our results show that asymmetric information and market power
both play an important role in the Italian market for small business lines of
credit. We find evidence of adverse selection and show that it negatively impacts
market outcomes, leading to higher prices, less lending, and more default. At the
same time, we also find that market power can mitigate the negative effects of
adverse selection: when banks have higher markups, they moderate price increases
to reduce the negative consequences of adverse selection on the quality of their
borrower pools. These results speak to the debate on the cost and benefits of
competition in financial markets. While competition is generally beneficial to
borrowers, a more competitive market reduces banks’ ability to absorb negative
shocks, exacerbating the effects of adverse selection exactly when firms might
most need credit. Banking regulators and competition policymakers should be
aware of these effects when considering the impact of their decisions on small
business lending.
Our paper is related to three main strands of research in economics. The first
is a recent and growing theoretical literature analyzing markets with asymmetric
information and imperfect competition. Lester et al. (2017) show that equilib-
rium contracts in insurance and credit markets are jointly determined by adverse
selection and market power, and that increased competition and reduced infor-
mational asymmetries can be detrimental for welfare. Mahoney and Weyl (2017)
show that when a monopolist insurer’s market share is high, an increase in ad-
verse selection drives prices down and quantities up, as the monopolist internalizes
the increased default costs of its marginal customers. We add to this literature
by taking a model with similar features to lending markets and measuring the
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relative importance of, and interaction between, the two frictions.
The second is the literature on empirical models of asymmetric information.
While this literature has largely focused on insurance markets, we look at the less
studied area of credit markets, where the most recent applications have followed
both experimental (D. Karlan and J. Zinman 2009) and structural (Einav, Jenk-
ins and Levin 2012) approaches. Our empirical model is closest to that developed
by Starc (2014). Her work looks at the welfare impact of imperfect competi-
tion in the US Medigap market accounting for customer self-selection into insur-
ers’ optimal pricing strategies. We share with Starc (2014) the identification of
imperfect competition, through a structural model of demand for differentiated
products.However, the market we analyze differs substantially along many im-
portant institutional dimensions. Insurers in the US Medigap market are heavily
regulated for pricing, minimum loss ratios, and retaliatory taxes, whereas Italian
banks face different kinds of regulations, but have almost no restriction on their
pricing of loans.4 Moreover, firms in our data typically borrow from more than
one bank, as there is no exclusivity in business lending. As a consequence, our
empirical approach and identification strategy differs substantially from hers.
Finally, we contribute to the empirical literature analyzing lending markets.
One branch of this literature applies structural estimation techniques to analyze
consumer and firm behavior in these markets (K. Ho and J. Ishii 2011, R. S. J.
Koijen and M. Yogo 2017, M. Egan, A. Hortac¸su and G. Matvos 2017). No pa-
per, however, studies market structure and its interaction with adverse selection.
Another branch uses data similar to ours and provides reduced-form evidence
consistent with various implications of adverse selection (G. Gobbi and F. Lotti
2004, Bofondi and Gobbi 2006, F. Panetta, F. Schivardi and M. Shum 2009, U.
Albertazzi, G. Eramo, L. Gambacorta and C. Salleo 2015). To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first paper that uses structural methods to study how ad-
verse selection and market structure interact in the market for banks’ business
lending.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section I we describe the dataset
and the market, and present reduced form tests of adverse selection and imperfect
competition. Section II outlines the structural model and Section III describes
our model of price prediction and the econometric specification of demand, loan
use, default and supply. The estimation and the results are in Section IV, the
counterfactuals are in Section V, and Section VI concludes.
I. Data and Institutional Details
We use a unique and comprehensive dataset of Italian small business lines of
credit to study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition.
4For example, insurers in her setting cannot price discriminate based on expected claims, whereas
banks can and do price discriminate based on expected default.
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It is based on four main sources of data: data on individual loans from the Italian
Centrale dei Rischi, or Central Credit Register; firm-level balance sheet data from
the Centrale dei Bilanci, or Company Accounts Data Services; banks’ balance-
sheet and income-statement data from the Banking Supervision Register; and
data on bank branches at the local level since 1959.5 By combining these data,
we obtain a matched panel dataset of borrowers and lenders extending over an
eleven-year period, between 1988 and 1998.
A. Loan Data
The Central Credit Register (hereafter “Credit Register”) is a database that
contains detailed information on individual loans extended by Italian banks. For
each of a number of different types of loans, banks must report data for each
individual borrower on both the amount granted and the amount used for all
such loans if their total amount exceeds a given value threshold.6 In addition,
a subgroup of around 90 banks (accounting for more than 80 percent of total
bank lending) also provides detailed information on the interest rates they charge
to individual borrowers on each loan. We restrict our attention to short-term
lines of credit, which have ideal features for our analysis.7 First, the bank can
change the interest rate at any time. This means that differences between interest
rates on loans are not influenced by differences in loan maturity. Second, loan
contracts in the Credit Register are homogeneous products, so that they can be
compared across banks and firms. Third, lines of credit are not collateralized, a
key feature for our analysis, as issues of adverse selection become less relevant
for collateralized borrowing. Fourth, short-term bank loans are one of the main
sources of borrowing by Italian firms. According to our data, short-term lines of
credit represent over half of total bank lending to firms. We define the interest
rate as the ratio of the payment made in each year by the firm to the bank to the
average amount of the loan used.
We focus on firms’ “main credit line” in the first year they open at least one
line of credit. In Italy, firms have relationships with multiple banks to reduce
liquidity risk (E. Detragiache, P. Garella and L. Guiso 2000). We define a firm’s
main credit line as the loan on which the firm borrows most. On average for the
firms in our sample, it accounts for around 75% of the total share of credit (both
credit extended and credit used). Since Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000), considering
only the first year is common in empirical models of asymmetric information. We
do so to avoid modeling challenging topics like heterogenous experience ratings
5The first three datasets were previously used in Panetta, Schivardi and Shum (2009). Further
information about each is available there. Detailed information about the last dataset is available in L.
Ciari and N. Pavanini (2014).
6The types of loans reported are lines of credit, financial and commercial paper, collateralized loans,
medium and long-term loans, and personal guarantees. The loan value threshold was 41,000 euros until
December 1995 and 75,000 euros thereafter.
7A line of credit establishes a maximum loan balance that a lender permits a borrower to draw upon.
The borrower can access funds up to this maximum at any time and pays interest only on the outstanding
balance.
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among borrowers, loan renegotiation, and learning by firms and/or banks, though
these are very interesting avenues for future research. This means that we restrict
our attention only to the first year in which we observe a firm in our data.8 This
reduces the sample of firms from around 90,000 to just over 36,500. Panel A of
Table 1 reports the loan-level information that we use in the empirical analysis.
Out of these 36,520 firms, 69% take up a loan in our sample period and use
on average 67% of the amount granted. The average amount granted is around
e370,000, and the average interest rate is 14.2%.
Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the 94 banks that report
detailed interest rate information. The average total asset level is almost 11
billion Euros and they employ on average 3,200 workers. The average bank is
present in 34 provinces out of 95, but with significant variation across banks.
B. Firm Data
The Centrale dei Bilanci (hereafter CB) collects yearly data on the balance
sheets and income statements of a sample of about 35,000 Italian non-financial and
non-agricultural firms. This information is collected and standardized by the CB,
who then sells these data back to banks’ lending divisions. The unique feature of
the CB dataset is that, unlike other widely used datasets on individual companies
(such as the Compustat database of US companies), it has wide coverage of small
and medium enterprises, almost all of which are unlisted. The coverage of these
small firms makes the dataset particularly well-suited for our analysis, because
informational asymmetries are potentially strongest for these firms. Initially, data
were collected by banks themselves and transmitted to the CB. Over time, the
CB has increasingly drawn from balance sheets deposited with local chambers of
commerce, where limited liability companies are obliged to file. The firms in the
CB sample represent about 30% of the total value added reported in the national
accounting data for the Italian non-financial, non-agricultural sector.
In addition to collecting the data, the CB computes an indicator of the risk
profile of each firm, which we refer to in the remainder of this paper as the
“Score”. The Score represents our measure of a firm’s observable default risk. It
takes values from 1 to 9 and is computed annually using discriminant analysis
based on a series of balance sheet indicators (assets, rate of return, debts etc.)
according to the methodology described in E. I. Altman (1968) and E. I. Altman,
G. Marco and F. Varetto (1994). The inputs into a firm’s Score approximate
closely the information that a lending bank has available at the time a loan is
granted, as reported in the survey by G. Albareto, M. Benvenuti, S. Mocetti, M.
Pagnini and P. Rossi (2011) described in detail in Section III.A.
We define a borrowing firm as one that is present in the Credit Register. Non-
borrowing firms are defined according to two criteria: they are not in the Credit
8To avoid left censoring issues we drop the first year of our sample (1988) and just look at new
relationships starting from 1989.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Variable Nobs Mean Std. Dev. Nobs Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Demand 36,520 0.69 0.46
Loan Level Loan Use 25,351 246.1 444.8
Default 25,351 0.06 0.23
Amount Granted 25,351 367.3 476.7
Interest Rate 25,351 14.24 4.58
Panel B: Total Assets 900 10,727 16,966
Bank Level Employees 896 3,180 4,583
Number of Provinces 861 34.54 30.19
Panel C: Borrowing Firms Non-Borrowing Firms
Firm Level Total Assets 25,351 11,336 19,825 11,169 3,622 8,601
Net Assets 25,351 2,300 6,499 11,169 931 3,621
Intangible Assets 25,351 360 2,066 11,169 131 1,079
Intangible/Total Assets 25,351 0.16 0.23 11,169 0.22 0.29
Profits 25,351 1,033 2,910 11,169 292 1,403
Cash Flow 25,351 673 2,185 11,169 255 1,183
Sales 25,351 14,478 25,014 11,169 5,029 12,084
Trade Debit 25,351 1,710 3,546 11,169 814 3,617
Short Term Debt 25,351 2,263 5,697 11,169 125 1,512
Leverage 25,351 0.55 0.86 11,169 0.21 0.70
Firm’s Age 25,351 12.92 12.89 11,169 10.73 12.12
Score 25,351 5.36 1.77 11,169 4.78 2.14
Distance to Branch (km) 25,351 2.92 6.72
Number of Lenders 25,351 2.87 2.22
Share of Main Line 19,751 0.76 0.25
Panel D: Number of Banks 702 8.60 4.83
Market level Number of Branches 6,036 14.95 24.46
Share of Branches 6,036 0.06 0.08
Years in Market 6,036 21.06 14.23
Market Shares 6,036 0.08 0.08
Deposit Amount 2,566 21,113 18,883
Number Deposit Accounts 2,566 654 523
Deposit Interest Rate 2,566 6.51 1.72
Note: This table reports sample statistics for the variables in our analysis. In Panel A, an observation is
a firm for the first variable and a loan for the others. Demand is a dummy variable indicating whether
a firm obtained a credit line, Loan Use is the amount of loan used in thousands of euros, Default is
a dummy for a firm having any of its loans classified as bad within the next three years (see Section
I.C below for further details), (Loan) Amount Granted is in thousands of euros, and Interest Rate is a
percentage. In Panel B, an observation is a bank-year. Total Assets are in thousands of e, Employees is
the number of employees at the end of the year, Number of Provinces is the number of provinces where a
bank is actively lending. In Panel C, an observation is a firm. Total, Net, and Intangible Assets, Profits,
Cash Flow, Sales, Trade Debit, and Short Term Debt are in thousands of e. Intangible/Total Assets is
the ratio of intangible over total assets, Leverage is the ratio of debt over equity. Firm’s Age measures
the years since a firm’s foundation. Score is an indicator of the risk of the firm computed each year by
the CB (higher values indicate riskier companies, see Section I.B for more details). Distance to Branch
is the distance in kilometers between the city council of each firm and the city council of the closest
branch of the bank it borrows from, calculated using the geographic coordinates. Number of Lenders is
the number of banks from which a firm opens a line of credit. Share of Main Line represents the ratio of
credit used from a firm’s main line of credit over total credit used, when credit used is positive. In Panel
D, an observation is province-year for the Number of Banks, bank-province-year for the subsequent four
variables, and bank-region-year for the last three variables. Number and Share of Branches are per bank-
province-year, Years in Market are the number of years a bank has been in a province since 1959. Market
Shares are in terms of number of borrowers. Deposit Amount is the total value of a bank’s deposits in a
region-year in thousands of e. Number of Deposit Accounts is in thousands. Deposit Interest Rate is a
percentage.
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Register and report zero bank borrowing in their balance sheets. We use the
second definition to exclude firms that are not in the Credit Register but are still
borrowing from banks, either from one of the non-reporting banks or through
loan types other than lines of credit. Panel C of Table 1 reports descriptive
statistics for our sample of borrowing and non-borrowing firms. Borrowing firms
have larger assets and sales and an average of 2.9 credit lines active every year.
On average, the share of credit used from the main line is 76%.
There is ample evidence that firms, particularly small businesses like the ones
in our sample, are tied to local credit markets. For instance, M. A. Petersen
and R. G. Rajan (2002) and H. Degryse and S. Ongena (2005) show that lending
to small businesses is a highly localized activity, as proximity between borrow-
ers and lenders facilitates information acquisition and reduces borrowers’ travel
costs. Segmentation of local credit markets is thus very likely to occur. We use
Italian provinces, administrative units roughly comparable to a US county, as our
definition of banks’ geographical markets.9 At the time of our data, there were 95
Italian provinces. We report summary statistics for these markets in Panel D of
Table 1. There we show that there are 8.6 banks per province-year in our sample,
each bank has on average just under 15 branches per province and a market share
of 6% for branches and 8% for loans. The market share of the outside option,
defined by those firms that choose not to borrow, is on average around 30%. On
average a bank has been serving a province for at least 21 years.
Even though our dataset includes both borrowing and non-borrowing firms, we
have no information on banks’ loan approval decisions. For this reason we need
to assume that all firms are offered an interest rate, or know the interest rate
that each bank in their province would charge them, and then decide which bank
is their best alternative, if any. In our model, a bank that classifies a firm as
very risky and for which it does not wish to offer a loan cannot formally reject
it, but instead offers it a sufficiently high interest rate to make the firm’s demand
probability very low (similarly its loan use if it ultimately chooses the bank). As
such, it allows for an indirect form of loan rejection. Combined Credit Register
datasets of loans and loan application have only recently become available to
researchers, as in G. Jime´nez, S. Ongena, J. L. Peydro´ and J. Saurina (2014) for
the case of Spain. Analyzing the loan approval process is an important area for
further research.
9Provinces are a good measure of local markets in Italian banking for three reasons. First, this was the
definition of a local market used by the Bank of Italy to decide whether to authorize the opening of new
branches when entry was regulated. Second, according to the Italian Antitrust authority, the “relevant
market” in banking for antitrust purposes is the province. Third, previous research has concluded that
bankers’ rule of thumb is to avoid lending to a client located at more than 1.4 (Degryse and Ongena 2005)
or 4 (Petersen and Rajan 2002) miles from a branch. In our data firms are on average 2.9 km (1.8 miles)
from the closet branch of their main bank.
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C. Default
We define defaults in our data as follows. Banks must report to the Credit
Register if they classify a loan as “bad debt”, meaning that they attach a low
probability to the event that the firm will be able to repay the loan in full. This
is done when firms are in liquidation or other bankruptcy proceedings, and for
those loans that have not made payments for at least six months. This warning
cannot be filed for a single overdue payment, but can only occur as the result
of a negative evaluation from the bank about of the borrower’s overall financial
situation, and usually occurs prior to a legally certified bankruptcy filing. There
is institutional and anecdotal evidence that when one bank sends this kind of
default warning to the Credit Register it has a “domino effect” on all other loans
the defaulting firm has with other banks.10 In our data, 82.3% of firms receiving
such a warning cease all bank borrowing in the same year, 15.1% in the following
year, and all remaining firms within 4 years. According to the Italian Civil Code,
information about firms’ defaults remains in the Credit Register for 10 years,
compromising a defaulting firm’s access to credit from any bank for that period
of time.
Following Panetta, Schivardi and Shum (2009), we classify default as the event
a firm’s main line of credit will be defined as bad debt within three years of being
granted. We choose this window as we are interested in adverse selection and
want the default event to be relatively close to when the loan was granted.11 We
choose this particular limit also because we can trace firm defaults until 2001,
3 years after the end of our sample, and this ensures that we have a uniform
definition of failure for all firms, including those that start borrowing toward the
end of our sample. According to this definition, 6% of new loans default during
our sample period (see Table 1).
D. Preliminary Evidence of Imperfect Competition and Asymmetric Information
We provide some descriptive evidence of asymmetric information and imperfect
competition before presenting the structural model. To save on space, we report
the full analysis in the Online Appendix, available on the webpage of the American
Economic Review, and only summarize the main results here.
A positive correlation between bank concentration and interest rates in the
Italian banking sector has previously been documented both for loans (P. Sapienza
2002) and deposits (D. Focarelli and F. Panetta 2003). This relationship also holds
in our data. Using both the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the 3-bank
concentration ratio as our measure of market concentration, we find that higher
concentration is generally associated with higher interest rates on loans.
10Source: www.tuttocentraledeirischi.it, support web page for borrowers dealing with the Credit Reg-
ister.
11This definition captures the majority of defaults: among the new borrowers on which we focus, we
find that almost 70% of the firms that eventually default receive a default warning and no longer borrow
from banks within 3 years of their first loan.
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As discussed in the Introduction, providing evidence of asymmetric information
is more difficult as it is by definition unobserved. Following Chiappori and Salanie´
(2000), we conduct positive correlation tests between both the decision to take up
a loan and default and between the decision of how much of a granted loan to use
and default. A positive correlation between the unobservables is interpreted as
evidence of asymmetric information, as it implies that firms that are more likely
to demand credit are also more likely to default (in the first case) and that firms
that use more of their loans are also more likely to default (in the second). We de-
scribe the details of the empirical framework underlying these positive correlation
tests in the Online Appendix. Our results indicate a statistically significant posi-
tive correlation between both pairs of unobservables, suggesting that asymmetric
information does play a role in this market. These results are later confirmed in
our structural estimates presented in Section IV below.
Based on these descriptive results, we formulate and estimate a structural model
to measure the extent of asymmetric information and its consequences for market
outcomes. The structural framework has four main advantages compared to the
reduced form tests summarized in this section. First, it has a more flexible corre-
lation structure for the residuals that allows us to estimate them jointly. Second,
it delivers more accurate measures of market power than simple HHI and con-
centration indexes. Third, it allows us to distinguish between adverse selection
and moral hazard. Finally, we can use the structural model to run counterfactual
policy experiments to measure the consequences of both adverse selection and
imperfect competition, and to understand how they interact with each other in
Italian markets for small business lines of credit.
II. The Model
A. Overview and Key Assumptions
The model we construct aims at quantifying the effects of asymmetric infor-
mation on the demand for and supply of small business lines of credit for Italian
firms. We assume that each of i = 1, ..., Imt firms in market m in year t is willing
to invest in a project and is looking for credit to finance it. Firms select their
main line of credit from among j = 1, ..., Jmt banks active in m in t, if any, that
maximizes their benefits.12 This determines the demand for credit. Conditional
on taking a loan, firms also decide the amount of credit to use and whether or
not to default. We assume that each bank j active in market m in year t sets
interest rates, Pijmt, for each firm i in that market-year based on a static model
of Bertrand-Nash competition on interest rates.
12Firms make borrowing decisions based on the impact they have on their long-run profitability. We
do not have enough information about borrowers to estimate these profits, however, and so represent
them here as “utilities”. This also helps distinguish them from banks’ profits, which we are able to
estimate.
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The theoretical model we develop relies on three important assumptions. The
first was described in detail in Section I: we limit our analysis to the demand
and pricing of firms’ main line of credit in the first year they open at least one
credit line. As motivated there, we do so to abstract from dynamic issues in
firms’ lending relationships and to simplify the scope of the empirical analysis.
The second assumption relates to asymmetric information. Following Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981), we assume that the informational asymmetry in this market
concerns the riskiness of the firm. Specifically, conditional on observables, a firm’s
riskiness is known by that firm but not by any of the Jmt banks in its market;
instead, banks are assumed to know the distribution of riskiness across firms. We
also assume that both borrowers and lenders are risk neutral.
Our third assumption relates to how the amount of credit granted to a firm is
determined. As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we assume banks use interest rates
as their only screening device. More specifically, we assume that the amount of
credit granted from bank j to firm i is exogenously given by the firm’s project
requirements, and that the bank offers an interest rate for that specific amount of
credit to each firm i in each market m in year t. We justify this assumption based
on the institutional features of the market we study. In a standard insurance or
credit market with asymmetric information, insurers or banks can compete not
only on prices, but also on other terms in the contract. Indeed, in environments
with lending exclusivity, banks can offer menus of contracts that specify both the
amount of credit granted and the associated interest rate, for example charging
interest rates that increase with the amount of granted credit. This forces bor-
rowers to self-select into contracts based on their unobserved riskiness, revealing
some of their private information. Importantly, there is no contract exclusivity
in the Italian market for small business lines of credit: borrowers can (and do)
open multiple credit lines with different lenders. As explained in Chiappori and
Salanie´ (2013), in the absence of contract exclusivity, no convex price schedule can
be implemented.13 As such, we are comfortable that the exogeneity of granted
credit is likely to hold in our application.
B. Demand, Loan Use and Default
Preliminaries
Given these assumptions, let there be i = 1, ..., Imt firms and j = 1, ..., Jmt
banks in m = 1, ...,M markets in years t = 1, ..., T . Let firms have the following
utility from their main line of credit, which determines their demand:
(1) UDijmt = α¯
D
0 +X
′D
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt + α
DPijmt + Y
′D
ijmtη
D + εDi + νijmt,
13If interest rates rise with the amount borrowed, borrowers can “linearize” the schedule by opening
several credit lines with multiple banks. Indeed, in the pricing regressions we later use to predict prices
for non-chosen banks, we find evidence of a negative relationship between interest rates and the amount
of granted credit. We thank Pierre-Andre´ Chiappori for his suggestions on this point.
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where XDjmt is a vector of bank-market-year determinants of demand (“D”),
Pijmt is the interest rate offered by bank j to firm i in market m in year t, Y
D
ijmt
is a vector of (non-price) firm-bank-market-year determinants of demand, ξDjmt
represents banks’ unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes in market m in
year t, and νijmt represents unobserved shocks to i’s demand for bank j. Finally,
εDi represents firm i’s individual propensity to demand credit that is known to
the firm but not the bank and is therefore the source of asymmetric information
in the model. We model this as a random coefficient on the constant term,
αD0i ≡ α¯D0 + εDi , i.e. a shock to firm i’s demand for credit from any bank. We
let UDi0mt = νi0mt be the utility from the outside option, which is not borrowing
from any of the Jmt banks active in market m in year t. Firms choose their main
credit line from the bank that maximizes their utility, or else they choose not to
open a credit line at all (j = 0).
Conditional on borrowing, each firm chooses the amount of credit to use to
maximize the following utility:
(2) ULijmt = α
L
0 +X
′L
jmtβ
L + αLPijmt + Y
′L
ijmtη
L + εLi ,
where XLjmt is a vector of bank-market-year determinants of loan use (“L”),
Y Lijmt is a vector of firm-bank-market-year determinants of loan use, and ε
L
i rep-
resents the unobserved (to the bank) propensity of firm i to use credit.
Finally, conditional on borrowing, each firm chooses to default if its utility from
doing so is greater than zero:
(3) UFijmt = α
F
0 +X
′F
jmtβ
F + αFPijmt + Y
′F
ijmtη
F + εFi ,
where XFjmt is a vector of bank-market-year determinants of default (“F”), Y
F
ijmt
is a vector of firm-bank-market-year determinants of default, and εFi represents
firm i’s propensity to default, which is also observed by the firm but not by the
bank. Note that while firm i has utility from each of the Jmt banks offering main
lines of credit in market m in year t, it only has one such main credit line it can
use and/or on which it can default.
We face two challenges when going from the economic to the econometric model.
First, we only observe prices for bank-firm pairs that actually established a loan
relationship, while to estimate the model we will also need prices charged by the
banks that each firm did not choose. Second, while we have extensive information
about firms’ characteristics, there might still be determinants of demand, loan
use, and default that are observed by banks but not by us as econometricians. In
Section III we explain how we use a specific feature of our data, multiple bank
relationships, to address both issues.
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Information Structure, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
The main purpose of the model is to distinguish between information observed
by both banks and firms, and information private to each firm. The former
includes both hard information in the form of observable firm covariates, Yijmt
(e.g., firm-specific income statement and balance sheet variables), as well as soft
information known to the bank through its interaction with the firm. Private
information known to firms but not to banks, by contrast, is captured by the
unobservables εDi , ε
L
i , and ε
F
i . We assume that ε
D
i , ε
L
i and ε
F
i are fixed firm
attributes that don’t vary across banks, and are distributed according to the
following multivariate normal distribution:
(4)
 εDiεLi
εFi
 ∼ N
  00
0
 ,
 σ2D ρDLσDσL ρDFσDρDLσDσL σ2L ρLFσL
ρDFσD ρLFσL 1
  .
Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we interpret a positive correlation between
the firm-specific unobservables driving demand and default (ρDF ) as evidence of
adverse selection: a positive correlation between εDi and ε
F
i implies that firms
with a higher unobservable propensity to demand credit are also more likely to
default. Following similar logic, we interpret a positive correlation between the
unobservables driving loan use and default (ρLF ) as further evidence of adverse
selection.14 The correlation between unobservables driving demand and loan use
(ρDL) does not have an interpretation in terms of adverse selection, but simply
allows for the possibility that firms that are more likely to take up a loan are also
more likely to draw more on it.
Our model is similar to Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012), but differs in the spec-
ification of both demand and supply. In our case, borrowers (firms) choose among
multiple banks who compete for customers by setting prices (interest rates). This
raises the issue of how best to correlate residuals from the demand model, which
vary across both borrowers and alternatives (i.e. lenders), to the residuals from
the loan use and default models, which instead vary only across borrowers. We
resolve this issue by allowing the normally distributed random coefficient on the
constant term to be correlated with the residuals from the loan use and default
equations.15 This is a practical and intuitive solution, as it allows for a correlation
14One concern with this interpretation is the possibility that two firms that are equally risky ex-ante
take the same loan and one is hit by a negative shock after the contract has been signed that increases
both the use of its loan and its probability of default. Given that such a shock was not observed by
either the bank or the firm ex-ante, such a positive correlation between loan use and default would not
be related to adverse selection. There is also a further possibility that, following such a shock and an
increase in the use of its loan, the firm’s incentives to undertake risk could change. In this case, ρLF
could also be interpreted as evidence of moral hazard. Although theoretically possible, we believe that
these concerns are not likely to be important in our estimating framework as we measure the amount
used in the first year in which the contract is signed, which limits the time in which such shocks to firm
performance could occur.
15Such random coefficients are common in the literature on demand estimation for differentiated
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between unobservables only at the level of the borrower. This implies that risky
firms have high demand for credit from all lenders, and not differently across
different lenders.16
While the focus of the paper is estimating adverse selection, we also allow for
the presence of moral hazard. As shown by B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole (1997),
high repayment requirements on loans can reduce the incentives to exert effort,
thus increasing the default probability. Of course, firms that are observably riskier
may also be offered higher prices. To account for this, in our econometric model
we estimate αF using the component of price variation that is orthogonal to
firms’ observable and unobservable characteristics. As a consequence, following
W. Adams, L. Einav and J. Levin (2009), we interpret a positive effect of price
on default (αF > 0 in equation (3)) as evidence of moral hazard. We do not,
however, make this effect a focus of our counterfactual exercises.
C. Supply
On the supply side, we assume banks engage in Bertrand-Nash competition in
prices (interest rates). In particular, bank j’s expected profits from charging a
price Pijmt offered to firm i in market m in year t are given by:
(5) Πijmt = PijmtQijmt(1− Fijmt)−MCijmtQijmt,
where Qijmt and Fijmt are banks’ expectations of each firm’s demand and de-
fault, Pijmt is the interest rate on i’s loan, and MCijmt is bank j’s marginal cost
of lending to firm i in market m in year t. Expected demand, Qijmt, is given by
the product of the model’s demand probability and expected loan use by i for a
loan from j. This expected profit function corresponds to the standard one un-
derlying Bertrand-Nash pricing (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995), augmented
to account for the probability of default, Fijmt.
Note that expected default, Fijmt, depends on the price charged by bank j
through two channels. First, the default equation (3) allows for a direct impact
of interest rates on firms’ default probabilities (αF ). As described above, we
interpret such a relationship as evidence of moral hazard. Second, a higher inter-
est rate also changes the composition of borrowers: a higher price increases the
products (Berry 1994, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995). Following A. Nevo (2000b), we interpret
Y ′Dijmtη
D as observed heterogeneity in the random coefficient. These firm-specific and firm-bank specific
observable characteristics help us to control for the observable sources of the borrower’s taste for credit
(regardless of which bank it chooses), leaving εDi as the unobserved taste for credit (and source of
asymmetric information).
16We also estimated the model with the random coefficient on the interest rate rather than on the
intercept. We find similar results, in the sense that riskier firms have lower price elasticities and there
is statistically significant evidence of adverse selection. We maintain the assumption of the random
coefficient on the constant, as that is closer to the spirit of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model in which
firms have privately-observed differences in demand for credit, rather than privately-observed differences
in price sensitivity. We present the results of this alternative specification in the Online Appendix.
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expectation of εDi , firm i’s unobserved demand for credit, conditional on a loan
being taken as low-utility-from-borrowing firms are more likely to self-select out
of the borrowing pool. If ρDF > 0, this implies in turn that an increase in price
increases the average default probability of a bank’s pool of borrowers.
The first-order condition of this profit function delivers the following pricing
equation:
Pijmt =
MCijmt
1− Fijmt + F ′ijmtMijmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Marginal Cost
+
(1− Fijmt)Mijmt
1− Fijmt + F ′ijmtMijmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Markup
,
(6)
where F ′ijmt is the derivative of expected default with respect to price and
Mijmt = −Qijmt/Q′ijmt is bank j’s markup on a loan to firm i (with Q′ijmt
the derivative of expected demand with respect to price). Much like a regular
Bertrand-Nash pricing equation can be split into a marginal cost term and a
markup, so too can ours. The possibility of default, however, changes the nature
of each term and so we denote the first term in equation (6) bank j’s “Effec-
tive Marginal Cost” of serving firm i and the second term bank j’s “Effective
Markup.”17
The denominator in this pricing equation embodies the mechanisms by which
adverse selection and imperfect competition interact to determine prices in lending
markets. It has two terms: firm i’s repayment probability, given by one minus its
default probability, 1− Fijmt, and the derivative of this default probability with
respect to price, F ′ijmt, multiplied by bank j’s (conventional) markup on its loan
to i, Mijmt.
Consider first the impact of changes in adverse selection as measured by ρDF
on the first term in this denominator, 1 − Fijmt.18 As discussed above, firms
that borrow are more likely to have high unobservable demand for credit (εDi ).
The essence of adverse selection, ρDF > 0, is that these firms are also more
likely to default than an average firm.19 In such an environment, increases in
adverse selection increase the selectivity of the default unobservables, increasing
defaults, Fijmt. This pushes down the denominator in equation (6) and tends to
increase prices. We call this first effect of changes in adverse selection on prices the
“average borrower effect”: an increase in adverse selection increases the riskiness
of those that choose to borrow, increasing average default rates and thus prices.
Consider next the impact of changes in adverse selection on the second term in
17If default and its derivative are both zero, i.e. Fijmt = F
′
ijmt = 0, equation (6) simplifies to the
standard Bertrand-Nash pricing equation, Pijmt = MCijmt− QijmtQ′ijmt = MCijmt +Mijmt, showing that
price can be written as marginal cost plus a markup.
18For convenience, we articulate the effects of changes in adverse selection via changes in the correlation
in unobserved determinants of demand and default, ρDF . Similar effects obtain if we consider instead
the correlation in unobservable determinants of loan use and default, ρLF .
19See the Online Appendix for proofs of the claims made in this paragraph.
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the denominator of the pricing equation, F ′ijmt×Mijmt. While signing this term
analytically is difficult, the Monte Carlo exercise reported in the Online Appendix
indicates that when there is adverse selection (ρDF > 0), not only does default
increase with prices as banks lend to firms with higher unobservable demand for
credit (F ′ijmt > 0), but also that increases in adverse selection exacerbate this
effect (i.e., ∂F ′ijmt/∂ρDF > 0). Because markups are also positive, this increases
the denominator in equation (6) and tends to reduce prices. We call this second
effect of changes in adverse selection on prices the markup-mediated “marginal
borrower effect”: an increase in adverse selection increases the responsiveness
of default to price changes (F ′ijmt), increasing the relative safety of marginal
borrowers compared to average borrowers and increasing banks’ desire to keep
them by lowering prices.
Which of the average borrower or marginal borrower effect dominates price
changes when adverse selection increases depends on the level of competition,
measured by the markup term Mijmt, as this influences the value of marginal
borrowers. High levels of competition imply margins are low, lowering the value
to the bank of marginal borrowers, and encouraging banks to respond to increased
adverse selection by increasing prices. By contrast, low levels of competition imply
margins are high, increasing the value to the bank of marginal borrowers, and
encouraging them to respond to increased adverse selection with price reductions.
We further illustrate this non-monotonic response of prices to increases in ad-
verse selection in a Monte Carlo exercise presented in the Online Appendix. We
allow for both advantageous and adverse selection in the form of ρDF ∈ [−1, 1]
and analyze the pricing decisions of a monopolist facing a competitive fringe.
We parameterize competitive intensity by varying the slope of the monopolist’s
(residual) demand curve. Consistent with the economic effects described above,
the Monte Carlo indicates that when competition is strong (as measured by high
absolute values of the slope of residual demand), increases in adverse selection
increase prices and when competition is weak, they decrease prices.
D. Theoretical Work on Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets
Theoretical work on the relationship between asymmetric information and im-
perfect competition is still very limited. The paper that analyzes a setting most
comparable to ours is Mahoney and Weyl (2017).20 They study the interaction
of adverse selection and imperfect competition in insurance markets using graph-
ical price-theoretic reasoning in the spirit of L. Einav, A. Finkelstein and M. R.
Cullen (2010), but extended to allow for imperfect competition. They model
adverse selection as a correlation between consumers’ willingness to pay and in-
surers’ costs, causing marginal costs to be downward-sloping, and parameterize
20Lester et al. (2017) also analyze the interaction of asymmetric information and imperfect competi-
tion, but do so in markets with contract exclusivity, meaning firms can (and do) offer menus of contracts
in order to encourage buyers to self-select according to their private information. As argued above, there
is no exclusivity in the Italian business lending market.
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changes in adverse selection as a rotation of the industry marginal cost curve
holding population average costs constant. They show that, when insurers have
market power, increases in adverse selection can either raise or lower prices de-
pending on how the expected cost of the marginal consumer changes. Using linear
demand curves, they show that a monopolist facing an increase in adverse selec-
tion will raise prices if, before the change, it served less than half the population
and will reduce them otherwise.
The mechanisms underlying the price response of changes in adverse selection
in our setting are different and stem from fundamental differences between in-
surance and lending markets. In the insurance markets that are the main focus
of Mahoney and Weyl (2017), adverse selection manifests itself in its impact on
insurers’ marginal costs. By contrast, in lending markets like ours, adverse selec-
tion manifests itself in default rates that impact banks’ marginal revenue. This
is evident in the banks’ profit equation (5): banks must pay the cost of provid-
ing every loan, but only receive revenue (and thus marginal revenue) on those
loans that are repaid. Whereas adverse selection can therefore be parameterized
as a rotation in an insurer’s marginal cost curve in insurance settings, it can be
parameterized as a rotation in a bank’s marginal revenue curve in lending en-
vironments. Further theoretical work analyzing how imperfect competition and
adverse selection interact in the variety of markets characterized by informational
asymmetry is an important area for further research.
III. Econometric Specifications
A key challenge in estimating the model of the previous section is to account for
the differences in the information set of firms, banks, and us as econometricians.
Specifically, we assume that there are factors observed by all of firms, banks, and
us as econometricians (which we call “hard information”), factors observed by
firms and banks, but not us as econometricians (which we call “soft information”),
as well as factors observed by firms, but not banks or us as econometricians (which
we call “private information,” the correlations between which are our measures of
adverse selection). We need to ensure that we can distinguish between soft and
private information to properly identify the latter. We explain how we do so in
what follows.
A. Price Prediction
Overview
A crucial challenge that we face when implementing our empirical model is
that we only observe prices (interest rates) on loans from banks from which a
firm chose to borrow. As such, for our demand model in equation (1), we must
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predict the prices each firm faces at all other banks offering loans in its market.21
By contrast, for our loan use and default models, equations (2) and (3), we observe
and use in the estimation the actual prices paid by firms.
One of the main determinants of loan prices is borrowers’ riskiness as perceived
by banks, which is predicted by lenders using a combination of “hard” and “soft”
information (e.g. financial data versus a loan officer’s perceptions of a borrower’s
creditworthiness). Whether there is an information gap between us as econome-
tricians and banks as lenders, and whether any such gap is a problem for our
analysis, depends on how well we can capture banks’ actual pricing decisions.
We adopt several strategies to limit the potential extent of this problem. First,
we discuss the evidence regarding how banks price loan contracts, showing that,
particularly for large banks such as those in our sample, the hard information
we observe in our data is the key determinant of prices. Second, as described in
Section I, we only consider the first year in which a firm borrows. In addition
to allowing us to abstract from dynamic considerations in lending relationships,
this focus also lessens the information gap between us and the lender, as we only
consider loans from borrowers that approach a bank for the first time, and thus
for whom banks are less likely to have soft information. Third, we select the best
model for price prediction among a variety of alternatives based on both institu-
tional and econometric evidence. Importantly, in our preferred specification, we
exploit the fact that Italian firms frequently have multiple banking relationships,
which allows us to include firm fixed effects in our price prediction model. The
firm fixed effects capture any feature unobservable to the econometrician but ob-
servable to and common across banks, including soft information that we do not
directly observe. Fourth, we test the statistical and economic significance of the
residuals from this pricing regression in predicting default. If the residuals were
correlated with defaults, our prediction model would be systematically missing
a component of firms’ riskiness taken into account by banks when pricing loans.
In our preferred specification, we find no such correlation. Finally, while we are
confident that our price predictions do not adversely impact our measurement of
adverse selection in this market, we also discuss the implications for our results
of inaccurate price predictions.
Institutional Features of Banks’ Pricing Decisions
Before describing the modeling strategy we use to predict prices, we give an
institutional overview of how banks determine interest rates for new borrowers in
21 While predicting prices would seem to necessarily introduce measurement error into our econometric
framework, we believe the consequences of any such errors are likely to be small. In fact, firms might
need to predict prices as well: loan applications require time and effort, so firms might form expectations
for some of the prices rather than asking for a quote from each bank in their market. The model of
price prediction we present below can therefore be interpreted not only as a way to recover the price that
bank j charges firm i in market m in year t, but also our best estimate of firms’ price predictions. Any
measurement error then reflects differences between firms’ price predictions and ours, and may therefore
not be a source of econometric bias. That being said, to be conservative we approach our environment
as we would with conventional measurement error problems.
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this market. The datasets we use are the main sources of hard information used
by the banks in our sample. The Credit Register provides banks with information
about firms’ current set of loans, whereas the Centrale dei Bilanci (CB) provides
banks with a detailed archive of firms’ balance sheet information. As described
in G. Cerqueiro, H. Degryse and S. Ongena (2011) using US data, banks use both
hard and soft information to determine their lending policies. The importance of
each factor depends on loan and borrower characteristics, as well as the nature
of local lending markets and borrower-lender relationships.
To describe the institutional features of the Italian lending market, we rely on
the results of a survey conducted by the Bank of Italy, summarized in Albareto
et al. (2011), of over 300 Italian banks in 2007 about the organization of their
lending activities. Several features of this survey are relevant for our analysis.
First, it shows that larger banks, which are the ones we have in our data, tend
to rely more on hard information and standardized scoring techniques that we
are likely to capture with our econometric model. Second, large banks have on
average twice the number of layers of hierarchy between the top management and
the branch managers compared to small banks. Therefore, as predicted by J. C.
Stein (2002), large banks are likely to give less independence to branch managers
in lending policies due to the difficulties both in monitoring managers’ actions
and in managers’ ability to credibly transmit soft information about borrowers to
top management. Multiple layers of hierarchy also result in large banks having
shorter terms in office for branch managers, in part to avoid branch managers
developing relationships with local borrowers and deriving private benefits from
these. Both of these aspects limit the extent to which soft information can be
used by large banks in their lending policies. Last, large banks are asked to list
in order of importance the factors they consider in assessing creditworthiness of
a new loan applicant. The most important factors are: (i) Financial statement
data (i.e. hard information from the Centrale dei Bilanci), (ii) Credit relations
with the entire system (i.e. hard information from the Credit Register), (iii)
Statistical-quantitative methods, (iv) Qualitative information (i.e. bank-specific
soft information codifiable as data), (v) Availability of guarantees, and (vi) First-
hand information (i.e. branch-specific soft information). This ranking portrays
the key role played by hard information for large banks when dealing with new
borrowers. The survey also shows that small banks do rely more on soft informa-
tion, although even for these it is still less important than the first two forms of
hard information.
Price Prediction Model
Our model of price prediction is based on OLS regressions of prices on an in-
creasing set of control variables.22 In our preferred specification, we use firm fixed
22We also experimented with LASSO regressions, but it didn’t improve our results as in our preferred
specification we predominantly rely on fixed effects for which LASSO methods do not offer an improved
fit. For alternative ways of predicting prices, see J. Gerakos and C. Syverson (2015).
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effects to account for information observed by banks but not by us as econometri-
cians. As we are interested in the degree of asymmetric information at the time
a loan is granted, we continue to use only the first year in which a firm obtains
credit from its main bank, just as in the estimation sample. However, unlike the
estimation sample, where we only rely on the main credit line, to predict prices
we use the observations for all firm-bank relationships in place in this first year.
Firm-level controls in our model of price prediction include information from
firms’ balance sheets (measures of assets and debts) and income statements (mea-
sures of profitability and sales), the distance between a firm and a bank’s nearest
branch, and year, sector, area, and bank fixed effects (as well as their interactions,
depending on the specification).23 Given that we use uncollateralized credit lines,
which exhibit no heterogeneity in maturity, collateral, covenants and/or other
contract features important in other types of loans, the only loan-level control
variable is the amount of granted credit, entered linearly or as amount dummies,
depending on the specification. The decision to discretize the distribution of
granted amounts of credit comes from the shape of the empirical distribution of
the loans in our data, presented in Figure III.A below, which exhibits a significant
number of observations around a few mass points. For example, over 40% of the
loans we consider are exactly e50,000, e100,000, or e200,000 and 71% are exact
multiples of e50,000.
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 2, with increasing numbers
of controls included as one moves across the columns in the table. As anticipated
earlier, the coefficient on the amount of granted credit in columns (1) and (2)
is negative, showing that banks in the Italian market for small business lines of
credit do not use convex price/credit-limit schedules as a screening device. Indeed,
controlling non-parametrically for the amount granted using fixed effects (Column
3) confirms that interest rates monotonically decrease with loan size. The fit of
the regression increases marginally when going from separate bank, year, and
macro area fixed effects (Column 1) to dummies for the interaction of the three
variables (Column 2), to the same with granted credit fixed effects (Column 3).
The largest increase in the R-squared occurs when we introduce firm fixed effects
(Column 4), indicating that fixed firm attributes observed by banks but not by
us are an important element in the determination of prices. In this specification,
we are able to explain over 71% of the variation in observed prices, higher than
that typically obtained in the empirical banking literature.24 We interpret such
23In our price regressions, we adopt a parsimonious definition of geographic regions in terms of four
macro areas rather than 95 provinces. In specifications that interact area, bank, and year effects, these
interactions increase exponentially with the number of geographic areas: from 1,313 with bank-area-year
interactions to 10,802 with bank-province-year interactions. As the R-squared improves only marginally
(from 0.72 to 0.76), and the adjusted R-squared does not change, we choose the smaller number of areas.
24Petersen and Rajan (1994), Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011)
all measure the dispersion in prices charged by banks to small and medium enterprises. Each estimates
a loan-pricing model using lender, borrower, and loan-level information, finding R-squared of 14.5%
(Petersen and Rajan 1994), 25% (Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena 2011), and 22% (Degryse and Ongena
2005) (67% for loans over e50,000).
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Figure 1. Distribution of Amount Granted
Note: Amount Granted is in thousands of e. The observations above e500,000 (15% of sample) have
been excluded to simplify the interpretation of the graph.
effects as evidence of “soft information” in this market, a feature we are careful
to account for in our econometric model presented in the next subsection.
As we are concerned that banks may set prices based on unobserved firm char-
acteristics that may be correlated with risk and that may be missing from our
model of price prediction, we investigated whether unexplained variation in prices
is a predictor of firms’ subsequent default. To do so, we used the residuals from
each of the regressions presented in Table 2 as an explanatory variable in a regres-
sion of default on these plus the same controls used in each pricing equation.25
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 3. In specifications (1)-(3), we
find that the residuals are estimated to have a positive and significant effect on
default: a 1 standard deviation increase in the residuals is estimated to increase
default probabilities by between 4.7% and 4.2% of its standard deviation. It is
only in the last specification which includes firm fixed effects that we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the residuals have no effect on default.26
Based on this last result, we adopt the pricing model with firm fixed effects
as our preferred specification. Formally, this specification assumes that the price
charged to firm i borrowing from bank j in market m in year t , Pijmt, takes the
25We use a linear probability model for ease of interpretation, but estimates from a discrete choice
regression yield similar results. The controls were the same in each column as in Table 2, apart from
those in the final column: as firms default on all their lines almost simultaneously, we have only one
observation per firm in the default regressions and cannot therefore include firm fixed effects.
26The 95% confidence interval on the residual in this last specification is (-0.06,0.14). Furthermore,
its economic magnitude is also estimated to be substantially smaller: a 1 standard deviation increase in
the residuals would increase default by 0.3% of its standard deviation, or 1.4% of its mean.
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Table 2—Price Regressions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount Granted -2.37 -2.39 - -
(0.07) (0.07)
50,001-100,000 - - -1.47 -0.92
(0.07) (0.09)
100,001-150,000 - - -2.44 -1.55
(0.08) (0.09)
150,001-200,000 - - -2.77 -1.98
(0.10) (0.10)
200,001-300,000 - - -3.18 -2.19
(0.10) (0.10)
300,001-400,000 - - -3.72 -2.63
(0.11) (0.10)
400,001-500,000 - - -3.99 -2.88
(0.12) (0.11)
500,001-1,000,000 - - -4.37 -3.06
(0.12) (0.10)
1,000,001-3,000,000 - - -5.02 -3.44
(0.13) (0.12)
Distance to Branch -0.94 -0.70 -1.33 -0.40
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.30)
Constant 16.80 15.53 17.52 15.49
(0.18) (0.13) (0.15) (0.81)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes No
Bank FE Yes No No No
Area FE Yes No No No
Year FE Yes No No No
Bank-Area-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
R2 0.294 0.319 0.365 0.717
N obs. 92,596 92,596 92,596 92,602
Note: The table shows the results of OLS regressions of the interest rate (in percentage points) on a
series of controls and dummies. An observation is a firm-bank. The sample only includes the first year
in which a firm borrows, excluding 1988. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. Firm controls include
Sector and Score fixed effects, Sales, Total Assets, Net Assets, Profits, Cashflow, Leverage, and Short
Term Debt. Firm controls and distance are rescaled to interpret the coefficients more easily: the linear
term for Amount Granted is in e10,000, and Distance to Branch is in 100 km. Sector fixed effects group
sectors into 3 categories: Primary Sectors (primary goods, minerals’ extraction, chemicals, metals, and
energy), Manufacturing and construction and Commerce and Services. Area fixed effects are based on
four geographic areas of similar size in terms of population: North-West, North-East, Center, and South.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-area-year level in columns (1)-(3), and at the firm level in
column (4).
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Table 3—The Ability of Pricing Residuals to Predict Default
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Residual 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Residual SD 4.22 4.15 4.05 2.11
Default SD 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
1 Residual SD vs % of 1 Default SD 4.7% 4.7% 4.4% 0.3%
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes No No No
Area FE Yes No No No
Year FE Yes No No No
Bank-Area-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Amount Granted FE No No Yes Yes
R2 0.088 0.123 0.123 0.121
N obs. 35,316 35,316 35,316 35,316
Note: The table shows the results of OLS regressions of a dummy equal to one if the firm defaults on
a loan, and zero otherwise, on the residuals of the pricing regressions in Table 2 and other controls.
An observation is a firm. All the controls used are the same as in each respective column in Table 2,
with the exception column (4) where we cannot include firm fixed effects. Residual is divided by 100
for ease of interpretation. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. Standard errors are clustered at the
bank-year-province level.
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following form:
(7) Pijmt = γ0 + γ1Dijmt + γ2Lijmt + λjmt + ωPi + τijmt,
where ωPi and λjmt are firm and bank-area-year fixed effects, Dijmt is the dis-
tance between firm i and the nearest branch of bank j, Lijmt are dummies for
the size of the granted loan amount, and τijmt are prediction errors.
27 Using
combinations of the estimated coefficients γ˜0, γ˜1, γ˜2, λ˜jmt, and ω˜
P
i we are able to
predict prices P˜ijmt offered to borrowing firms from banks they could have chosen
but did not.
To predict prices offered to non-borrowing firms, we use propensity score match-
ing: we match several borrowing firms to non-borrowing firms that are similar
in observable characteristics, and then randomly assign a borrowing firm’s fixed
effect, ω˜Pi , to a matched non-borrowing firm. We assign the granted loan amount
to non-borrowing firms using the same approach. A detailed description of the
matching model is presented in the Online Appendix. A similar method was used
in Adams, Einav and Levin (2009).28
B. Econometric Model
As in the theoretical model presented in Section II above, let m = 1, ...,M index
a market (province), t = 1, ..., T a year, i = 1, ..., Imt a firm, and j = 1, ..., Jmt a
bank in market m in year t. Yijmt is a vector of non-price firm and firm-bank spe-
cific characteristics, some observed by both banks and us as econometricians (e.g.
“hard information” like a firm’s balance sheet and income statement data), and
some observed by banks but not by us as econometricians (e.g. “soft information”
like the perceived riskiness of the borrower). Xjmt is a vector of bank-market-
year-specific attributes (number and share of branches in the market, years of
presence in the market).
We estimate a system of three equations: demand for credit lines, amount
of loan used, and default. To do so, we use a 2-step method based on max-
imum simulated likelihood and instrumental variables estimation (K. E. Train
2009). In the first step, using data on firms’ choices of bank, loan use, and
default, we estimate the firm-level parameters across all three equations, η =
{αL, αF , ηD, ηL, ηF }, the bank-level parameters for the loan use and default equa-
tions, βLF = {αL0 , αF0 , βL, βF }, and the variance-covariance matrix of the errors in
the system, including our key measures of adverse selection, Σ = {σD, σL, ρDF , ρDL, ρLF }.
27With a slight abuse of notation we use the market (province) subscript m also for the four geographic
areas defined above, despite their being aggregations of provinces.
28 One potential criticism of our price prediction for non-borrowing firms is that we can match bor-
rowers to non-borrowers that are similar in terms of observables, but the firm fixed effect we assign to
non-borrowers is a combination of the borrower’s observables and unobservables, and of course we can-
not observe the latter. This can induce measurement error in the price prediction. We discuss possible
consequences of measurement error on our estimates in Subsection III.B.
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We also recover the bank-market-year specific constants (“mean utilities”) in the
demand model (δDjmt = α¯
D
0 + X
′D
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt) using the contraction method in-
troduced by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). These serve as the dependent
variables in the second step of the estimation, where we recover the price coeffi-
cient in the demand equation, αD, as described further below.29
Our estimation exercise faces two main challenges. First, we need to account for
the endogeneity of prices in the three estimating equations. Second, as in the price
prediction model, we need to allow for the possibility that the banks’ information
set is richer than the one that we use, i.e., that we accurately account for soft
information known to banks but not to us as econometricians. This problem
goes beyond that of an accurate price prediction. To see this, consider a firm
characteristic that is observed by the bank and it is therefore accounted for in its
pricing, but that also has an independent effect on the probability to demand for
credit and to default (e.g., the “reputation” of the borrower). If we do not control
for such a characteristic in the demand and default equations, we could generate
an omitted variable problem that would end up in the residuals of both models,
possibly generating a correlation between them not due to the adverse selection
we seek to measure. We explain how we address these issues in what follows.
First-stage Estimation
The goal of our estimation is to identify and estimate adverse selection, mea-
sured by correlation in the unobservable determinants of firms’ demand for credit,
loan use, and default. To do so, we need to consistently estimate the three equa-
tions describing firms’ behavior. We discuss them each in turn.
Consider first the demand equation. Our price prediction model allows us to
decompose the price charged to firm i by bank j in market m in year t as follows:
Pijmt = P˜ijmt + τ˜ijmt
= P˜jmt + γ˜1Dijmt + γ˜2Lijmt + ω˜Pi + τ˜ijmt,
(8)
where P˜jmt = γ˜0 + λ˜jmt is a bank-market-year specific component of the pre-
dicted price for all firms i in market m in year t, Dijmt is the distance between firm
i and the nearest branch of bank j, Lijmt are dummies for the size of the granted
loan amount, ω˜Pi is the estimated firm fixed effect from our pricing regression,
and τ˜ijmt are fitted prediction errors.
We assume that any determinants of demand observed by banks but unobserved
by us as econometricians, including soft information relevant for demand, will
be taken into account by banks when setting interest rates. We also assume
that such information can be summarized by an (unobserved to us) variable ωDi .
29We are unable to use the contraction method for loan use and default as we have a smaller number
of observations and many zeros in the loan use and default market shares. We explain this in detail in
Section III.C.
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Because a firm chooses only one main line of credit, we cannot estimate ωDi
directly. However, we can use the firm fixed effect estimated in the price prediction
by ω˜Pi as a proxy for this demand unobservable. We can do so because any
soft information influencing firm i’s demand for credit should also impact banks’
pricing to firm i and will be measured by ω˜Pi .
30 Therefore, in the spirit of a
control function approach, we relate soft information influencing demand to soft
information influencing pricing through the following equation:
ωDi = η
D
4 ω˜
P
i .(9)
Using this relationship, we can define all firm-level covariates influencing de-
mand as:
Y Dijmt = η
D
1 Dijmt + ηD2 Lijmt + ηD3 Yi + ωDi
= ηD1 Dijmt + ηD2 Lijmt + ηD3 Yi + ηD4 ω˜Pi ,
(10)
where Yi are observable firm covariates and the second line imposes our assump-
tion on the relationship between demand and pricing unobservables. Substituting
(8) and (10) into the demand equation (1), we obtain the following demand utility:
UDijmt = δ
D
jmt + α
D(P˜jmt + γ˜1Dijmt + γ˜2Lijmt + ω˜Pi + τ˜ijmt) + ηD1 Dijmt + ηD2 Lijmt + ηD3 Yi + ηD4 ω˜Pi + εDi + νijmt
= (δDjmt + α
DP˜jmt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ˜Djmt
+ (ηD1 + α
D γ˜1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η˜D1
Dijmt + (ηD2 + αD γ˜2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η˜D2
Lijmt + ηD3 Yi + (ηD4 + αD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η˜D4
ω˜Pi + ε
D
i + α
D τ˜ijmt + νijmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζijmt
= δ˜Djmt + Y
′D
ijmtη˜
D + εDi︸ ︷︷ ︸
VDijmt
+ζijmt,
(11)
where Y Dijmt = {Dijmt,Lijmt, Yi, ω˜Pi } and η˜D = {η˜D1 , η˜D2 , ηD3 , η˜D4 }.
Three aspects of equation (11) merit discussion. First, we cannot exclude that
any of the determinants of prices also affects demand and, as such, we have in-
cluded in the demand equation all the variables that we have used to predict
prices. For example, the distance between a firm and a bank can influence the
price that the bank offers but also the likelihood that a firm borrows from the
bank, conditional on the price. The parameters that we estimate on these firm-
and firm-bank covariates are therefore a mixture of the direct effect of that covari-
ate on demand and an indirect effect through prices. We denote these composite
effects η˜D1 , η˜
D
2 , and η˜
D
4 . Given a consistent estimate of α
D from the second-stage
30For example, suppose that older entrepreneurs have a lower propensity to demand credit due to
private savings and this is reflected in lower prices offered by banks. Given that we do not observe
entrepreneurs’ ages, this effect will be captured in the price prediction model by ω˜Pi which, in turn, can
proxy for this unobserved (to us) attribute in the demand equation.
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estimation (described below), we can then back out the (demand-only) param-
eters, ηD1 , η
D
2 , and η
D
4 . Second, the error term is a composite of the structural
demand and predicted price errors, ζijmt = α
D τ˜ijmt + νijmt, which we assume
is distributed as a Type I Extreme Value.31 Third, because the demand price
parameter, αD, does not enter equation (11) independently except as part of the
composite parameters of the structural error term, we cannot identify it in the
first-stage estimation. Instead, we estimate it in the second-stage IV procedure
that uses variation in average prices at the bank-market-year level P˜jmt.
32
Based on these assumptions, the probability that borrower i in market m in
year t chooses bank j is given by:
(12)
PrDijmt =
∫  exp
(̂˜
δ
D
jmt
(
XDjmt, P˜jmt, ξ
D
jmt, α¯
D
0 , α
D, βD
)
+ V Dijmt
(
Y Dijmt, σD, η˜
D
))
1 +
∑
` exp
(̂˜
δ
D
`mt
(
XD`mt, P˜`mt, ξ
D
`mt, α¯
D
0 , α
D, βD
)
+ V Di`mt
(
Y Di`mt, σD, η˜
D
))
 f(εDi )dεDi ,
where f(εDi ) is the density of ε
D
i , and
̂˜
δ
D
jmt are the bank-market-year specific
constants that we recover using the contraction method of Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995).
Estimation of the equations (2) and (3) describing loan use and default respec-
tively is more standard, as in this case we can directly use actual prices. For these
equations, all parameters are estimated directly in the first stage. As we explain
in detail in Section III.C, we address endogeneity of prices and unobserved de-
terminants (to us but not to banks) of loan use and default using various fixed
effects and a control function approach. The probability of observing a utilization
of L conditional on borrowing (D = 1), is given by:
PrLijmt,L|D=1 =E
[
Pr
(
Lijmt = α
L
0 +X
′L
jmtβ
L + αLPijmt + Y
′L
ijmtη
L + εLi |εDi
) |D = 1]
=
∫
φεLi |εDi
(
Lijmt − αL0 −X ′LjmtβL − αLPijmt − Y ′LijmtηL − µ˜εLi |εDi
σ˜εLi |εDi
)
f(εDi |D = 1)dεDi ,
(13)
where:
31 This assumption rules out any effect of measurement error on our estimates of adverse selection,
but our procedure is robust to the possibility that it does not hold. First, as discussed above, firms
themselves need to predict prices, so measurement error, if any, is likely to be small. Second, even in the
case that measurement error is not absorbed in the logit error, we show in the Online Appendix that, as
long as the residuals in the pricing regression of equation (7) are uncorrelated with default unobservables,
it can at most result in a conservative estimate of the degree of adverse selection.
32Note that, given that the correlation coefficients that measure adverse selection are estimated in the
first stage, they are not influenced by this second-stage IV procedure.
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εLi |εDi ∼ N
(
σL
σD
ρDLε
D
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
εL
i
|εD
i
, σ2L(1− ρ2DL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ˜2
εL
i
|εD
i
)
,
φ is the PDF of a standard normal distribution, and f(εDi |D = 1) is the density
of εDi conditional on borrowing. Finally, the probability of default (F = 1)
conditional on borrowing and loan utilization is:
(14)
PrFijmt,F=1|D=1,L =
∫
ΦεFi |εDi ,εLi
αF0 +X′FjmtβF + αFPijmt + Y ′FijmtηF − µ˜εFi |εDi ,εLi
σ˜εFi |εDi ,εLi
 f(εDi |D = 1)dεDi ,
where:
εFi |εDi , εLi ∼ N
(
AεDi +Bε
L
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
εF
i
|εD
i
,εL
i
, σ2F − (AρDF +BρLF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ˜2
εF
i
|εD
i
,εL
i
)
,
A =
ρDF σ
2
L−ρLF ρDL
σ2Dσ
2
L−ρ2DL
,
B =
−ρDF ρDL+ρLF σ2D
σ2Dσ
2
L−ρ2DL
.
The joint estimation of these three choice equations through maximum simu-
lated likelihood delivers estimates of the parameters in η, βLF and Σ, based on
the following log-likelihood function:
(15)
logL =
∑
i
dijmt{log(PrDijmt)+log(PrLijmt)+fijmt log(PrFijmt)+(1−fijmt) log(1−PrFijmt)},
where dijmt is the dummy for the choice by firm i of bank j in market m in
year t, and fijmt is the dummy identifying its default.33
Second-stage Estimation
We use instrumental variables estimation to recover the structural parameters in
the demand equation, including the demand price coefficient, αD. The contraction
method in the first-stage of the demand estimation finds the bank-market-year-
specific values, δ˜Djmt, that equate predicted market shares Ŝ
D
jmt to actual market
shares SDjmt. This iterative process is defined by:
33We use 100 Halton draws for simulation. According to K. E. Train and C. Winston (2007), 100
Halton draws achieve greater accuracy in mixed logit estimations than 1,000 pseudo-random draws.
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(16) δ˜D,r+1jmt = δ˜
D,r
jmt + ln
(
SDjmt
ŜDjmt(δ˜
D,r
jmt)
)
,
where r is the iteration number, the predicted market shares are ŜDjmt =∑
i Pr
D
ijmt/Imt, where Imt are the number of firms in market m in year t. Once re-
covered, we define these bank-market-year specific values as
̂˜
δ
D
jmt. These constants
contain the bank-market-year covariates, XDjmt, as well as the bank-market-year
specific component of predicted prices, P˜jmt. We use these estimated constants
as dependent variables in an IV regression on XDjmt and P˜jmt, using cost shifters
as instruments:
(17)
̂˜
δ
D
jmt = α¯
D
0 + α
DP˜jmt +X
′D
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt,
where ξDjmt is the structural econometric error term. A detailed explanation of
our identification strategy for all the equations follows.
C. Identification
We address potential endogeneity bias in the price coefficients in our three esti-
mating equations using instrumental variables in the second stage of the demand
equation estimation and a control function approach in the loan use and default
equation estimation.
Demand Instruments
The unobserved attributes ξDjmt in our second-stage IV demand estimation
(equation (17)) can be interpreted as borrowers’ (firms’) unobserved valuation
of a bank’s brand, quality, or stability which are known to the bank and there-
fore affect the bank’s interest rates in market m in year t. For example, ξDjmt
could capture a bank’s reputation for offering valuable and helpful assistance to
its borrowers in their business projects, unobserved to us as econometricians but
known to firms. Moreover, because we predict the prices that enter demand, ξDjmt
could also include market-specific measurement error in prices. As a first step
to address these endogeneity problems, we include bank, market, and year fixed
effects in our second-stage demand estimation. Bank fixed effects capture bank
characteristics that do not vary by market and year that might otherwise influ-
ence pricing, market fixed effects control for time-invariant market characteristics
that affect all banks within a market equally, and year fixed effects control for
any macroeconomic changes affecting lending in Italy over time. We can therefore
rewrite equation (17) as:
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(18)
̂˜
δ
D
jmt = α¯
D
0 + α
DP˜jmt +X
′D
jmtβ
D + ξDj + ξ
D
m + ξ
D
t + ∆ξ
D
jmt,
where ξDj , ξ
D
m, ξ
D
t are bank, market, and year fixed effects, and ∆ξ
D
jmt represents
market-year specific deviations from the national mean valuation of the demand
unobservable for each bank.
To account for the potential correlation between interest rates and these bank-
market-year-specific errors, we use information about household deposits at the
local bank level as instruments. Households’ bank deposits represent an important
source of capital that banks invest in loan products. The high degree of autonomy
that local branch managers have in their lending decisions, as described in Al-
bareto et al. (2011), implies that the ability of local branches to collect deposits at
more favorable conditions affects the loan conditions they can offer to borrowers.
The validity of the exclusion restriction rests on the fact that deposit conditions
are determined in a market with different buyers (households, not firms) for prod-
ucts with different demand characteristics than the loan market (bank accounts
and payment services, not lines of credit). These market differences, and the in-
clusion of bank fixed effects to account for any effects of a bank’s “brand” in both
markets, as well as market and year fixed effects, lessen concerns that variation
in deposits at the bank-region-year level are correlated with the error term in
demand for banks’ loans, ∆ξDjmt.
Formally, we use information on interest rates on household deposits, the euro
value of collected deposits, and the number of deposit accounts at the bank-region-
year level as demand instruments.34 First, higher interest rates on deposit are
likely associated with higher loan rates, as higher deposit rates mean it is more
costly for a bank to raise funds. A higher value of deposits is likely associated
with lower loan rates, as the bank has higher availability of funds. Finally, more
deposit accounts are likely associated with higher loan rates, because managing
deposit accounts involves fixed costs, so that, for given value of deposits, a higher
number of accounts implies a higher total cost. These predictions are verified in
our first-stage estimates, reported in the Online Appendix. We also find that the
instruments are jointly significant in explaining bank-market-year level interest
rates. Finally, as expected, instrumenting for price increases the estimate of the
elasticity of demand.
Loan Use and Default Instruments
We use a different set of instruments for prices in the loan use and default
equations. In this case, endogeneity comes from potential heterogeneity (observed
by banks) in firms’ need for external funds and likelihood of repayment which may
34We only have information about deposits at the bank-region-year level, where regions are geographic
areas that include on average 5 markets (provinces).
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be correlated with interest rates Pijmt. In particular, banks may price based on
soft information, unobserved to us as econometricians, which determines loan use
and default. To correct for any potential bias, we need price variation that is
orthogonal to a firms’ unobserved riskiness and need for external funds.
We adopt a two-part strategy to address this potential bias. First, we in-
clude bank and market-year fixed effects, which capture, respectively, market-
and time-constant bank characteristics and any market-year-specific unobserv-
ables. Second, following A. Nevo (2001) and J. A. Hausman and W. E. Taylor
(1981), we use prices in other markets as an instrument in the loan use and de-
fault equations. The logic of this instrument is that banks face cost shocks that
are common across markets and are reflected in their interest rates. For exam-
ple, idiosyncratic costs of obtaining funds for lending from the interbank market
are common across markets within a bank-year. Furthermore, conditional on the
large set of controls we include in our estimating equations, including the bank
and market-year fixed effects described above, we think it unlikely that prices
charged by banks in other markets are correlated with a firm’s decision regarding
the amount of its loan to use or to default.35 Thus we instrument the prices
charged by a bank j in a market m in year t with the average of the prices that
the same bank charges in all the other markets in the same year. The first-stage
regression reported in the Online Appendix shows that prices in other markets are
indeed relevant: an increase in interest rates in other markets implies statistically
significantly higher interest rates in a bank’s home market.
Given the nonlinearity of the first-stage estimating equations, we address po-
tential endogeneity concerns in the loan use and default equations using a control
function approach (Train 2009). We regress observed interest rates Pijmt on the
same observables that we use for loan use and default, as well as the instrument
(prices in other markets). We then use the residuals from this pricing regression
ûijmt as controls in the utility from choosing how much of a loan to use and
the utility from defaulting. In practice, this amounts to including ûijmt in the
estimating equations (13) and (14).
This control function approach has two benefits. First, conditional on the
residuals, ûijmt, and other controls, the remaining price variability is attributable
to variation in the instrument (prices in other markets) that is orthogonal to the
unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to draw and to default on the credit
line, resolving any endogeneity concerns. Second, it also resolves any concerns
about soft information that is observed to banks but not to us as econometricians.
As long as any soft information used by bank j to price the loan offered to firm i is
35The common concern using prices in other markets as an instrument in demand estimation is that
there can be unobserved demand shocks that are correlated across markets, for example national adver-
tising strategies, that invalidate the exclusion restriction. It is for this reason that we rely on household
deposits instead as instruments in the demand equation. Such issues are unlikely to be important for
firms’ loan use and default decisions, however. These choices are made after a loan is secured and are
likely to be determined by firms’ financial situation, not whether and how much their particular bank
advertises.
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orthogonal to prices in other markets (as is likely), the control function residual,
ûijmt, will include this soft information, preventing it from biasing our estimates
of adverse selection.
IV. Estimation and Results
The observables that we include in firms’ demand, loan use, and default equa-
tions are the firm and bank characteristics summarized in Table 1. These are
selected based on statistical testing and insights from the literature. Among firm
characteristics, we control for different measures of firm size, in the form of assets
and sales, but also for measures of firms’ current performance, in terms of profits
and cash flow (Albareto et al. 2011). We also control for other specific forms
of finance that firms have access to, such as credit from suppliers (trade debit),
as well as for the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, a measure of asset
pledgeability (M. A. Petersen and R. G. Rajan 1995). We include the firm’s age
and the distance between the city council where the firm is located and the city
council where the closest branch of each bank in the firm’s choice set is located
(Degryse and Ongena 2005). We also include fixed effects for the Score, the firm’s
industrial sector (primary, secondary, or tertiary), the granted loan amount, and
various combinations of bank, market, and year dummies.36 Finally, we include
the predicted interest rate in the demand equation, and the actual interest rate
in the loan use and default equations. Among bank characteristics, we include
the number and the share of branches that a bank has in a market-year, as well
as the number of years that it has been in the market. These variables capture
the experience a bank has in a market as well as the density of its network of
branches with respect to its competitors, both of which can be factors influencing
firms’ decisions.
We estimate our structural model on a subset of the full data for computational
and institutional reasons. Following A. M. Cohen and M. Mazzeo (2007), we
define a local banking market as the geographic area outside which borrowers
don’t choose lenders, meaning the markets should not be too small, and also
within which there are no overlapping markets, meaning that markets should not
be too big. Based on this and on our assumption that the choice set of a borrowing
firm is given by the banks actively lending in its market, out of a sample of 977
market-year combinations in our original data, we drop the first and last decile of
the market size distribution.37 This leaves us with 702 market-year combinations
36As explained in Section III.B, we estimate the demand model in two steps, and the loan use and
default models in one step. In the first step we estimate jointly some parameters of demand and all
parameters of loan use and default. In this stage we can rely on variation across firms as well as variation
across markets and time and therefore can include a richer array of bank, market, and year controls
(bank-market-year fixed effects for demand and bank and market-year fixed effects for loan use and
default). In the second step, we estimate the remaining parameters of the demand model, including
separate bank, market, and year fixed effects along with other bank-market-year level controls.
37To improve the convergence of the contraction mapping, we also eliminated a few markets with zero
or near-zero market shares of the outside option.
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in our estimation sample.
A. Results
The estimates of the structural model are presented in Table 4. The three
columns of results refer to the demand, loan use, and default equations, respec-
tively. The top panel in the table shows the effect of firm characteristics, the
middle panel the effect of bank characteristics, and the bottom panel the covari-
ance matrix of unobservable determinants of demand for credit, loan use, and
default. Our measures of adverse selection – the estimated correlation between
the demand and default unobservables (ρDF ) and the loan use and default unob-
servables (ρLF ) – are reported in a box at the bottom of the table.
We find that, as expected, higher interest rates have a negative impact on
demand for loans from a given bank. Furthermore, as described in Section III.C
and reported in the Online Appendix, instrumenting for price makes demand
more elastic. Using these estimates, we calculate the mean own- and cross-price
elasticities for the five largest banks in the sample and find that a 10% increase
in interest rates reduces a bank’s own market share by slightly more than 10%
and increases competitor banks’ shares by slightly less than 1%. Firms with more
cash flow and trade debit are less likely to borrow, but firms with more assets,
profits, and sales are more likely to borrow. Older firms are also more likely to
borrow. Firms tend to favor banks that are closer, and with a higher number and
share of branches in the market. They are also more likely to choose loans from
older banks.
The estimated effects of these same covariates on loan use follow the same
pattern as for demand for most of the relevant variables. As far as the default
probability is concerned, it increases with interest rates. Firms with more trade
debit face a higher rate, while the opposite is true for cash flow and sales. Note
that, given our control function approach, the price variability used to estimate
the price coefficient is orthogonal to both observed or unobserved firm characteris-
tics. As such, it measures how the default probability increases when a firm faces
an exogenously higher interest rate. Following Adams, Einav and Levin (2009),
we interpret its positive coefficient as evidence of moral hazard. The marginal
effect of price on default implies that a one standard deviation increase in inter-
est rate (a 4.6 percentage point increase) translates into a 0.12 percentage points
increase in default probability, or 2% of the average default rate.
The box in the third panel of Table 4 presents our primary parameters of inter-
est: estimates of adverse selection between both demand and default and between
loan use and default. The correlation coefficient between unobservables in the de-
mand and in the default equations is 0.16, that between unobservables in the loan
use and in the default equations is 0.14, and both are highly significant. In line
with the insight of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we find that firms with an unexpect-
edly high propensity to borrow are also unexpectedly more likely to default. We
also find that firms that use an unexpectedly high amount of their granted credit
36 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2017
are also unexpectedly more likely to default. We present counterfactual exercises
that help interpret the economic significance of these estimated magnitudes after
discussing the fit of the model and alternative explanations for our interpretation
of these correlations as adverse selection.
B. Fit of the Model
In Table 5 we provide some descriptive statistics on the fit of the model. We
choose to focus on the main objects of interest of the model: the predicted demand
probabilities, amounts of loan used, default probabilities, effective marginal costs,
and effective markups.38 We recover each bank’s borrower-specific marginal cost
using the pricing equation (6) as follows:
(19) M̂Cijmt = P˜ijmt
[
1− F̂ijmt + F̂ ′ijmtM̂ijmt
]
− (1− F̂ijmt)M̂ijmt
1− F̂ijmt + F̂ ′ijmtM̂ijmt
,
where M̂ijmt = −Q̂ijmt/Q̂′ijmt is the predicted markup for bank j on a loan to
firm i, F̂ijmt is the predicted expected default probability of firm i on that loan,
and F̂ ′ijmt is its derivative with respect to the price. Given M̂Cijmt, we calculate
effective marginal costs and effective markups as shown in equation (6).
Table 5 shows that the model fits the mean of the data well, but predicts less
variation than that in the data. Despite the relative inelastic own-firm demand,
we estimate effective markups of 71 basis points (.71 percentage points, or 5% of
the average interest rate of 14.48 percent).39 To help validate our model estimates,
we investigated whether our predicted marginal costs correlate with information
about banks’ costs to which we have access. We find that conditional on bank,
region, and year fixed effects, our estimated marginal costs are negatively corre-
lated with the value of deposits, positively correlated with the number of deposit
accounts, and positively correlated (but with no statistical significance) with de-
posit interest rates. These support our use of these variables as instruments in
our second-stage demand estimation.
C. Alternative Explanations for Positive ρDF and ρLF
We interpret a positive correlation between unobserved determinants of the
demand for credit and firms’ decision to default, ρDF and ρLF , as evidence of
adverse selection, but alternative explanations for such a correlation are possible.
One alternative is that it arises because of agency issues between equity and debt
38When predicting demand probabilities we set the econometric error (∆ξDjmt) to zero as otherwise
we would perfectly predict market shares regardless of our parameter estimates.
39We find that for 957 firms out of 36,520 (2.6%), there is at least one firm-bank observation with
a negative predicted marginal cost. We omit those firms from this table and from the counterfactual
analysis.
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Table 4—Structural Estimates
Demand Loan Use Default
Price
{
Interest Rate -1.45 -0.01 1.06
(0.62) (0.00) (0.02)
Assets

Total Assets 5.84 0.09 -0.04
(0.08) (0.00) (0.03)
Intangible/Total Assets -0.82 -0.01 0.08
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Profitability

Profits 1.12 0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Firm Level Cash Flow -0.93 -0.05 -0.12
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Sales 7.16 -0.01 -0.34
(0.07) (0.00) (0.04)
Debt
{
Trade Debit -3.44 -0.04 0.12
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Others

Firm’s Age 0.23 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Distance to Branch -1.22 -0.01 -0.04
(0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Number of Branches 4.38 0.01 0.03
(0.15) (0.00) (0.02)
Bank Level Share of Branches 0.53 -0.07 -0.27
(0.04) (0.01) (0.10)
Years in Market 0.06 0.01 -0.13
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
Score Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
First-stage Loan Amount Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Bank-Market-Year Yes No No
Bank No Yes Yes
Market-Year No Yes Yes
Observations 506,230 25,351 25,351
Covariance Matrix (Σ)

σD = 0.34
(0.00)
ρDL = 0.10 σL = 0.30
(0.00) (0.00)
Adverse Selection
ρDF = 0.16 ρLF = 0.14 σF = 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Note: All coefficients are estimated in the first stage, with the exception of the Interest Rate, the
Number of Branches, the Share of Branches and the Years in Market for the demand equation, that are
estimated in the second stage. Second stage fixed effects, only for the demand equation, are at the bank,
market and year level. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. Standard errors are in brackets. First stage
standard errors are calculated by the inverse of the Information matrix, obtained providing the solver
with analytical gradient and hessian. Second stage standard errors are computed with 200 bootstrap
replications.
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Table 5—Descriptives on Model Fit
Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev.
Actual Demand 506,230 7.21 25.87
Predicted Demand 506,230 7.21 15.16
Actual Loan Use 25,351 246.06 444.75
Predicted Loan Use 25,351 245.42 297.34
Actual Default 25,351 5.83 23.44
Predicted Default 25,351 5.82 9.74
Predicted Price 452,594 14.48 4.54
Predicted Effective Marginal Cost 452,594 13.77 4.57
Predicted Effective Markup 452,594 0.71 0.48
Note: All variables are predicted at the firm level. Actual Demand is a dummy equal to one if the firm
takes the loan from a bank and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100. Predicted Demand is the respective
demand probability from our model, again multiplied by 100. Actual and Predicted Loan Use refer to
loan use in the data and in our model, in thousands of e. Actual Default is a dummy equal to one if the
firm defaults and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Predicted Default is the
respective default probability from our model, again multiplied by 100. Predicted Price is the interest
rate predicted by our model as of equation (6). Predicted Effective Marginal Cost and Predictive Effective
Markup are computed based on the two right hand side terms in equation (6), with Effective Markup
being the negative of the second term. Predicted Price, Effective Marginal Cost, and Effective Markup
have fewer observations than Actual and Predicted Demand as there is no predicted price for the outside
good.
holders. M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling (1976) show that debt financing gives
rise to agency costs, causing firms to make decisions that don’t serve shareholders’
interests. In our context, this would imply risk-shifting by firms with more debt,
which in turn would decrease the quality of firms’ projects and increase their
default probabilities. More generally, firms and banks could adjust their financing
structure as asymmetric information varies. Another possible explanation follows
from S. C. Myers (1977), who argues that firms with more debt are more likely
to run into debt overhang, declining to fund good projects and increasing their
default probabilities.
While theoretically sound, we believe that these alternative explanations are
unlikely to hold in our data. With respect to agency issues and risk-shifting, we
rely on a sample of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), most of which are
owned and controlled by an individual or a family.40 In these firms, ownership
is concentrated and bank debt is, with trade debit, the main source of finance.41
40M. Bugamelli, L. Cannari, F. Lotti and S. Magri (2012) show that 85.6% of Italian SMEs are family
businesses, and in 66.3% of these cases the family also manages the firm, compared to 25.8% of such
cases in France, 28.0% in Germany, 35.5% in Spain, and 10.4% in the UK.
41Equity markets were very underdeveloped in Italy during the years of our data (D. G. Demekas, B.
Potter and M. Pradhan 1995). There were less than 400 firms on the stock market and SMEs were very
unlikely to list. Furthermore, G. Barba Navaretti, M. Bugamelli, F. Schivardi, C. Altomonte, D. Horgos
and D. Maggioni (2011) show that the share of firms financed by venture capital is between 0.35% and
0.52%, and the bond market for small firms is non-existent due to legal restrictions on bond issuances
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Typically, owners of family firms hold a large portion of their overall wealth in the
firm itself (T. J. Moskowitz and A. Vissing-Jorgensen 2002) and, as a consequence,
undertake less risky, more conservative projects than a well-diversified owner or
an external CEO (C. Michelacci and F. Schivardi 2013). Moreover, in all our
regressions we control for various indicators of the incentives to engage in risk-
shifting, including net worth, cash flows, profits, and trade debit. We feel that
excessive risk-taking is therefore unlikely to arise due to firms’ financial structure.
With respect to theories of debt overhang, we look only at firms’ first entry into
credit markets, when firms have relatively low levels of debt.42 Furthermore, the
solution proposed by Myers (1977) to suboptimal investments caused by agency
costs is to shorten debt maturity, concluding that permanent debt capital is best
implemented by rolling over short-maturity debt claims. In our setting, credit
lines can be closed at any time by the bank, thus the specific loans we consider
are less likely to give rise to these agency issues.
V. Counterfactuals
We run three counterfactual policy experiments to quantify the effects of ad-
verse selection, as well as to understand the relationship between adverse selection
and imperfect competition. In the first counterfactual, we analyze the impact of
an increase in adverse selection on equilibrium prices, demand, loan use, and de-
fault. Its goal is to quantify the economic implications of our estimates of adverse
selection in terms of relevant outcome variables. We examine how prices, demand,
loan use, and default vary as we increase the correlation between unobserved de-
terminants of demand, loan use, and default, as well as how these effects change
with banks’ market power.
In our second counterfactual exercise we increase banks’ marginal costs under
our estimated baseline level of adverse selection and analyze its consequences
for equilibrium prices, demand, loan use, and default. Increases in the cost of
funding can be related to situations of distress in financial markets, to changes
in monetary policy, and to macro-prudential policies imposing tougher capital
requirements. With this exercise we seek to identify how adverse selection and
imperfect competition, and their interactions, affect the transmission mechanisms
of banks’ higher capital costs to lending activity.
With the last counterfactual, we investigate further the interaction between
adverse selection and imperfect competition by simulating a merger between the
two largest banks in each local market, both under our estimated baseline and a
higher level of adverse selection.
for SMEs.
42The average leverage of new borrowers is below 50%, while that of borrowers beyond the first year
is above 55%.
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A. The Effects of Increased Adverse Selection
In our first counterfactual exercise, we analyze the consequences for market
outcomes of an increase in adverse selection, implemented by doubling the esti-
mated correlation coefficients between unobserved determinants of demand, loan
use, and default, ρDF and ρLF .
43 We first predict market outcomes with greater
adverse selection and then investigate whether and how the changes that we ob-
serve from our (estimated) baseline levels are correlated with measures of banks’
market power. As is typical in counterfactual exercises, we assume that marginal
costs remain the same in the counterfactual scenario, although “effective marginal
costs” change with changes in counterfactual default rates. We re-calculate firms’
demand probabilities, loan use, and default probabilities with the counterfactual
level of adverse selection, and derive new equilibrium prices as:
(20) P ijmt =
M̂Cijmt
1− F ijmt + F ′ijmtMijmt
+
(1− F ijmt)Mijmt
1− F ijmt + F ′ijmtMijmt
,
where M̂Cijmt is each bank’s borrower-specific marginal cost from equation
(19), and F ijmt and Mijmt = −Qijmt/Q′ijmt are the new equilibrium default
probabilities and markups in the counterfactual setting, with equilibrium quanti-
ties Qijmt given by the counterfactual demand probabilities (Q
D
ijmt) multiplied by
the counterfactual amount of loan used (Q
L
ijmt).
44 We then compute the changes
in these variables with respect to the same variables predicted by the model at our
estimated parameters, what we call the “baseline” case. We report these changes
at the firm-market-year level (i.e., aggregated across banks for each firm), both
in percentage points (P.P.) and as a change relative to predicted baseline levels
(%).45
The first group of columns in Table 6 shows that a doubling in the correlation
between unobserved determinants of demand, loan use, and default (ρDF and ρLF )
causes a 1.87 percentage points (or 12.9%) increase in the average interest rates
43We have experimented with larger and smaller changes in these correlation coefficients and obtain
results scaled in proportion to the change in the ρ’s. We increase both correlation coefficients as they
are both measures of adverse selection, and from a policy perspective we are more interested in their
combined effect than in their relative importance.
44In some cases, our model predicts negative loan use. Given that we compute growth rates, to avoid
loosing such observations in those cases we set loan use to 1e.
45 The percentage variation in prices is measured as ∆Pijmt = 100 × P ijmt−P˜ijmt
P˜ijmt
, where P ijmt is
the new counterfactual price and P˜ijmt is the price predicted by our model in the baseline case. We
define similarly percentage variations in demand probabilities and loan use. The percentage point change
in prices is measured as ∆Pijmt = P ijmt − P˜ijmt, whereas for demand probabilities it is measured as
∆QDijmt = 100 × (Q
D
ijmt − Q̂Dijmt), and similarly for default. We only analyze and report percentage
point variation for default, given that the very small baseline probabilities can give rise to very large
percentage changes that are harder to interpret.
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Table 6—Summary Statistics for Counterfactual Changes in Outcomes for Higher Adverse
Selection and Higher Marginal Costs
Higher Adverse Selection Higher Marginal Costs
Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
P.P. Price Variation 35,563 1.87 5.76 1.78 3.50
% Price Variation 35,563 12.9 40.9 11.0 18.6
P.P. Demand Variation 35,563 -1.28 6.17 -1.47 4.96
% Demand Variation 35,563 -4.1 14.5 -5.0 10.0
Loan Use Variation 35,563 -0.7 2.4 -0.7 1.4
% Loan Use Variation 35,563 -0.3 2.0 -0.6 2.2
P.P. Default Variation 35,563 5.84 22.37 1.84 4.58
Note: These variables are average changes at the firm-market-year level. See footnote 45 for variable
definitions. Loan Use changes are in thousands of e. Higher Adverse Selection corresponds to a doubling
of the estimated values for ρDF and ρLF from Table 4; Higher Marginal Costs corresponds to a 5%
(approximately 70 basis points) increase in banks’ marginal costs.
offered by banks. There is substantial heterogeneity in these price responses,
however, with interest rates to some firms more than doubling and many not
changing at all.46 Demand probabilities decline by 1.28 percentage points (4.1%),
as does (slightly) loan use (by e700 or 0.3%). On average, higher adverse selection
significantly worsens banks’ pool of borrowers, more than doubling average default
probabilities (from 5.5 to 11.4 percent).47
We are particularly interested in how these predicted changes in prices, quanti-
ties (both demand and loan use), and default vary with banks’ market power. To
do so, we use as a measure of market power the fitted “effective markups” facing
each firm at our estimated baseline levels of adverse selection. We then run OLS
regressions of our predicted changes in firms’ interest rates, demand probabilities,
loan use, and default probabilities on these measures of banks’ market power. We
aggregate this information to the firm level (i.e. across banks for each firm).48
The top panel in Table 7 shows that higher effective markups are negatively cor-
related with changes in interest rates and default probabilities, and positively
correlated with the changes in demand probabilities and loan use. In particular,
we find that a one standard deviation increase in banks’ average effective markup
is associated with a 6 percentage points lower change in price (∆Pijmt), a 2.2
percentage points higher change in the probability of taking a loan (∆QDijmt), a
0.2 percentage points higher change in loan use (∆QLijmt), and a 2.1 percentage
46The large increase in some rates represents an implicit way for the model to predict that a bank
“rejects” a risky borrower by ensuring the firm has both a low demand probability and a low loan use
if a loan is taken. A richer dataset including loan approval information would allow us to address this
aspect of lending decisions.
47In the Online Appendix we show that increased adverse selection predicts more mass in both tails
of the default distribution.
48In the Online Appendix we show that we obtain very similar results when we conduct our analysis
at the more disaggregate firm-bank-market-year level.
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Table 7—Regressions of Counterfactual Outcomes’ Changes on Markups for Higher Adverse
Selection and Higher Marginal Costs
Variables ∆Pijmt ∆Q
D
ijmt ∆Q
L
ijmt ∆Fijmt
Higher Adverse Selection
Effective Markup -0.38 0.15 0.01 -0.13
(0.06) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Bank-Market-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.134 0.155 0.092 0.097
N obs. 35,563 35,563 35,563 35,563
Higher Marginal Costs
Effective Markup -0.42 0.22 0.01 -0.11
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
Bank-Market-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.433 0.451 0.112 0.447
N obs. 35,563 35,563 35,563 35,563
Note: An observation is a firm-market-year. Price, demand probabilities, and loan use changes are
measured in percentages. Default changes are measured in percentage points. See footnote 45 for
dependent variables’ definition. Effective Markup is constructed as the negative of the second term on
the right hand side of equation (6). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-market-year level.
points lower change in default probability (∆Fijmt).
These results confirm the intuition of the effects described in Section II.C:
banks with higher market power respond to an increase in adverse selection by
either lowering their prices or increasing their prices by less than banks with lower
market power. As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), this price reduction (or smaller
price increase) in response to increases in adverse selection attracts more (or loses
fewer) of the banks’ increasingly safe marginal borrowers, lowering the average
default probability of banks’ borrowers.
B. The Effects of Increased Costs of Capital
In our second counterfactual, we explore the consequences of increased capital
costs. To do so, we analyze the counterfactual effects of a 5% increase (roughly
70 basis points) in banks’ marginal costs and compare these to the effects of
increased adverse selection that we simulated in the last subsection. We simulate
this higher cost of capital under the baseline level of adverse selection and examine
the price, quantity, and default responses across firm-bank relationships. As for
the previous policy experiment, we then regress the changes in these outcomes on
the effective markups from the baseline model.
The second group of columns in Table 6 shows the change in price, demand,
loan use, and default associated with this 5% increase in banks’ cost of capital.
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We find that prices always increase when marginal costs rise. The average increase
is 1.78 percentage points (11.0%), comparable to that arising under a doubling of
adverse selection, but with half the standard deviation. As expected, as average
prices rise, average demand and loan use decline. Unlike the case of higher adverse
selection, however, default rates only increase by 1.84 percentage points, less than
one-third the increase found there. The explanation for this difference is that
while increases in marginal costs increase prices, they do not modify the sensitivity
of defaults to price changes. By contrast, an increase in adverse selection not only
increases prices, but also makes borrowers with high willingness to pay riskier,
further decreasing the quality of banks’ borrower pools. For a given change in
price levels, this implies a larger increase in the percentage of defaults.
The bottom panel of Table 7 presents regression results relating these changes
in outcomes to our measure of banks’ market power (their effective markups in
our baseline results), where we show that higher effective markups are associated
with reductions in price and default changes and increases in quantity changes. In
particular, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the effective markup
reduces the price variation (∆Pijmt) by around 6.6 percentage points, increases
the variation in demand probabilities (∆QDijmt) by 3.5 percentage points and in
loan use (∆QLijmt) by around 0.2 percentage points, and reduces variation in
defaults (∆Fijmt) by 1.7 percentage points.
49 As was the case for an environment
in which adverse selection increases, banks with higher market power can better
absorb an increase in the cost of capital in the presence of adverse selection.
C. Merger Simulation
In a final counterfactual, we explore the effects of an increase in concentration
by simulating a merger between the two banks with the highest market shares
in each of our 702 market-year combinations. On average, the largest bank in a
market has a market share of 22%, while the second-largest has a market share of
13%. In the counterfactual we change only the ownership structure of the newly
merged banks, allowing them to offer two different prices to each borrower as a
result of joint profit maximization.
We simulate this merger under two different scenarios to illustrate the impact of
increased adverse selection on the effects of mergers. First, we allow the two main
banks to merge under the baseline level of adverse selection. We then compare
this to outcomes when they merge at the doubled level of adverse selection we
analyzed in our first counterfactual. Table 8 shows the changes in prices, demand,
loan use, and default under each scenario. In the first group of columns, changes
in outcomes are with respect to the case of no merger and our baseline (estimated)
levels of adverse selection, whereas in the second case, they are with respect to
the case of no merger and twice our estimated levels.
49We find very similar results when we run these regressions at the firm-bank-market-year level, as
reported in the Online Appendix.
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Under baseline levels of adverse selection, interest rates rise by an estimated
0.15 percentage points (1.0%) in response to higher concentration. Similar to
the findings of A. Nevo (2000a) in markets for differentiated cereal products,
only a few prices increase in response to the mergers, depending on the degree
of substitutability between the differentiated banks. Most of the market-wide
average price increase is driven by price increases of the merged banks, which rise
by 0.73 percentage points (or 5.7%) on average. There is important heterogeneity
across markets in this effect, however, with prices decreasing in 16.4% of cases
(and only ever for the merged banks). As expected, given the predicted average
price increase, average loan use declines and average default probabilities rise.
Under higher levels of adverse selection, we find even smaller average price
effects of merger. Average prices decline on a percentage-point basis and over
33% of prices decrease. As a consequence, average demand probabilities increase
slightly and average default probabilities decline. Again, there are differences
across banks: average prices increase slightly in merged banks (0.15 percentage
points, or 4.5%), and decline slightly in non-merged banks. This exercise further
confirms that higher adverse selection mitigates the consequences of increased
market power and can even reverse them.
Table 8—Summary Statistics for Counterfactual Changes in Outcomes for Merger under
Baseline and High Adverse Selection
Baseline Adverse Selection High Adverse Selection
Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev. < 0 Mean Std. Dev. < 0
All Banks
P.P. Price Variation 35,563 0.15 1.52
16.4%
-0.02 1.57
33.2%
% Price Variation 35,563 1.0 9.9 0.4 9.3
P.P. Demand Variation 35,563 -0.19 2.67 0.08 2.98
% Loan Use Variation 35,563 -0.1 1.1 -0.1 1.7
P.P. Default Variation 35,563 0.14 1.18 -0.03 0.96
Merged Banks
P.P. Price Variation 35,563 0.73 6.45
17.1%
0.15 7.64
33.1%
% Price Variation 35,563 5.7 47.1 4.5 47.3
Non-Merged Banks
P.P. Price Variation 35,196 0.06 0.95
0%
-0.04 0.13
11.4%
% Price Variation 35,196 0.3 4.4 -0.0 0.4
Note: These variables are average changes at the firm-market-year level. See footnote 45 for variables’
definition. Loan Use changes are in thousands of e. There are less firms in this table compared to Table
6 because in three markets there is only one bank in a market so no merger takes place. Note that in
the High Adverse Selection case the mean of the % Price Variation is positive, but the mean of the P.P.
Price Variation is negative. This is driven by the different skewness of the two distributions.
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VI. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the interaction between imperfect competition and
asymmetric information in the Italian market for small business lines of credit.
We use a rich dataset with detailed information about credit contracts between
firms and banks, including all the main Italian credit institutions and a highly
representative sample of firms. We estimate a structural model of firms’ demand
for credit, loan use, and default, and join with it a model of bank pricing to
individual firms. We find evidence of adverse selection, in the form of a positive
correlation between unobservables determining both demand and default as well
as loan use and default. We also find a causal effect of interest rates on borrowers’
default, which we interpret as evidence of moral hazard.
We conduct three counterfactual policy experiments to quantify the importance
of adverse selection and investigate its interaction with market power for prices
and credit supply. We show that increases in adverse selection and in banks’ cost
of capital cause prices to increase, demand and loan use to fall, and default to rise.
Higher market power, however, moderates these effects. Similarly, higher adverse
selection moderates and can even reverse the effects of banks’ consolidation on
prices, demand probabilities, loan use, and default.
These findings have several important policy implications. They confirm that,
as theory predicts and taken in isolation, both market power and adverse selec-
tion worsen lending conditions. That being said, we also document that imperfect
competition moderates the effects of adverse selection and vice versa. This sug-
gests that competition and banking policymakers should jointly consider the two
factors, particularly in those contexts where either is likely to be strong. In
practice, the idea that financial markets are characterized by a trade-off between
competition and stability due to informational frictions is diffuse in the policy
circles. Our structural estimates offer a quantitative assessment of the costs and
benefits of market power in banking in the presence of adverse selection.
Of course, these conclusions are predicated on the scope of our study. In par-
ticular, our modeling strategy focuses on a subset of the choices firms and banks
make in credit markets and our conclusions should be interpreted with these
choices in mind. First, we have neglected the fact that many Italian firms bor-
row from multiple banks, concentrating on each’s largest line of credit. Second,
we only focus on the first year in which a firm borrows from a bank, and have
not considered how lending relationships between firms and banks evolve over
time. Third, our estimates do not allow the degree of asymmetric information
to vary over the business cycle. This is important if adverse selection is stronger
during recessions, in which case a very competitive financial sector could amplify
the effects of negative aggregate shocks. Finally, given that we do not estimate
borrowing firms’ profits, we cannot directly measure social welfare; as such, our
framework cannot address the issue of the optimal supply of credit. Each of these
topics is interesting and worthy of further research.
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